The Billy Wright Inquiry Oral Submissions

Hearing: 2nd July 2009, day 156

Click here to download the LiveNote version

 

 

 

 

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BILLY WRIGHT

PUBLIC INQUIRY

 

 

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held at:

The Court House

Banbridge

County Down

 

on Thursday, 2nd July 2009

commencing at 10.00 am

 

Day 156

 

 

 I N D E X

 

Submissions by MR KANE ........................... 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 1 Thursday, 2nd July 2009

2 (10.00 am)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Kane?

4 Submissions by MR KANE

5 for the WRIGHT FAMILY (cont.)

6 MR KANE: My Lord, just one or two matters from yesterday.

7 First of all, could I correct a mistake which was made

8 in our written submission which I repeated yesterday?

9 In our written submission at page 95 there is

10 a reference to a senior official. The impression is it

11 was a NIPS official. That error was previously made

12 because of a redaction issue and it should not have been

13 read as such either in the written submission or by

14 myself yesterday. If that correction can be noted.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Where is it?

16 MR KANE: It is page 95.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Page 95, yes.

18 MR KANE: You will see at the bottom of page 95:

19 "... a senior official, presumably from ..."

20 That is wrong.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: What line is it?

22 MR KANE: The very bottom line, line 31.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I see it.

24 MR KANE: That is wrong. It was repeated yesterday. We had

25 this issue before. It arose out of a redaction problem.

1
 1 It was not a senior official from NIPS, and I want to

2 make that perfectly clear. It was, in fact, someone

3 from the paramilitary world.

4 Secondly, again an error which I just want to clear

5 up. It is footnote 616. Instead of saying Day 148, it

6 should have said Day 147. Anyone looking up the 148

7 reference will see a modest and very self-deprecating

8 comment by yourself, my Lord, about sleeping habits in

9 the context of Mr Stewart's cross-examination.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: It is 147 anyway?

11 MR KANE: Yes.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

13 MR KANE: Turning to the matter you raised with me yesterday

14 afternoon and the issue of rebuttals, perhaps it is like

15 the Intrep. The rebuttals are there, but it is whether

16 or not they are able to be found. Some of the rebuttals

17 were perhaps more oblique than express. Some of my

18 colleagues felt the barbs, and confirmed they felt the

19 barbs, but for the avoidance of doubt, can I indicate to

20 you the topics and the lines and the pages of the

21 LiveNote references yesterday in relation to the

22 rebuttals which we say were made on a number of issues.

23 First of all, in terms of Mr McNeill, pages 163 and

24 164. Can I also, however, indicate that in our written

25 submission we say that the signing of the petition

2
 1 occurred later the same day. Yesterday in my oral

2 contribution the word "later" was dropped. We do accept

3 that the timing is not evidentially supported and is not

4 clear, but perhaps inferentially it does stand.

5 Secondly, the question of Mr Crompton. This is

6 dealt with in LiveNote at pages 192 and 193. However,

7 the transcript in LiveNote does not pick up part of what

8 I said relating to the use of the word "induction"

9 rather than "handover", but I am sure the finished

10 product of LiveNote will reflection that particular

11 issue.

12 Thirdly, the issue of firearms was dealt with at

13 page 149.

14 Fourthly, the issue of roof protection was dealt

15 with at pages 174 and 175.

16 Fifthly, the delay in the provision of the report

17 from the Red Cross was dealt with at page 182.

18 Sixthly, the issues relating to Mr McLaughlan were

19 dealt with in and around page 196.

20 If I could then return to where I left off, I was

21 dealing with the question of Mr McLaughlan's diaries.

22 I had got to the point of 18 June 1997. I only wish to

23 highlight there once again the triumvirate features, as

24 indeed they do on 20 June 1997.

25 A catalogue of ongoing reminders of the

3
 1 hostage-taking incident make it all the more

2 inexplicable that McLaughlan did not ensure that the

3 information concerning the threat to the life of

4 Billy Wright was properly processed and brought to the

5 attention of his superiors in a formal written and

6 accountable fashion. Those reminders are as follows.

7 Firstly, on 6 May 1997, Mr McLaughlan establishes

8 reports into the hostage-taking.

9 Secondly, on 25 June 1997, Mogg urges McLaughlan to

10 act with haste in preparing reports into the

11 hostage-taking.

12 Thirdly, on 1 October 1997, Mr McLaughlan is writing

13 to Mogg about the reports.

14 Fourthly, on 22 October 1997, McLaughlan records

15 Mo Mowlam attending Maghaberry to present commendations

16 to those who played prominent parts in the hostage

17 situation.

18 Fifthly, on 2 December 1997, the assistant director

19 contacted McLaughlan about the reports.

20 Sixthly, on 10 December 1997 at a combined security

21 meeting which Mr McLaughlan chaired, reference is made

22 to hostage-taking.

23 Finally, the seventh reference is 12 March 1998,

24 after the murder of Mr Billy Wright, where at a combined

25 security meeting reference is made to the three INLA

4
 1 prisoners who allegedly killed Billy Wright.

2 Astonishingly, in light of Mr McLaughlan's poor

3 recall, on 19 January 1998, there was a memo from

4 McLaughlan to Alan Shannon referring to conversations

5 "this weekend", directly -- directly, I stress -- with

6 the IRSP and INLA. This, in our view, demonstrates

7 ongoing connections between McLaughlan and the INLA,

8 despite his protestation about failing to recall such

9 contact in the 1997 onwards period.

10 On 9 February 1998, there is also a reference to

11 Mr McLaughlan bemoaning the fact that he has not

12 persuaded Shannon to agree to the transfer of the three

13 INLA prisoners that he held in Maghaberry, and he notes

14 that they are the men who killed Billy Wright:

15 "I have been talking to Ard Chomhairle Member

16 number 3."

17 I have to say that to the Wright family this is

18 a sickening ongoing contact between McLaughlan and the

19 INLA prisoners responsible for the murder of

20 Billy Wright, where it appears that again McLaughlan's

21 first loyalty is towards their appeasement.

22 On 18 February 1998, Mr McLaughlan recalls that he

23 met McWilliams and received information that an officer

24 would be killed. We then see what McLaughlan did on

25 this occasion. It is recorded in the diary that

5
 1 McLaughlan spoke to Shannon and advised him that the

2 threat had to be taken seriously and that the three

3 prisoners should be returned to the Maze. This is

4 deeply disquieting to the Wright family and the point

5 must be made: why was a similar line of contact not made

6 between McLaughlan and Shannon in April 1997; or was

7 such a line of contact, in fact, made?

8 McLaughlan's failure, if that occurred, was

9 a collusive act, which clearly facilitated the death of

10 Billy Wright. If, on the other hand, McLaughlan did, in

11 fact, tell Mr Shannon and Mr Mogg, then the triumvirate

12 stand accused.

13 19 February 1998 we see ongoing contact between

14 McLaughlan and the INLA outside and we see first

15 references to the triumvirate on 20 February and

16 24 February 1998.

17 Then, on 5 March 1998, it is noted by Mr McLaughlan

18 that:

19 "The RUC are not impressed that I should have

20 contact with groups outside and are quite annoyed about

21 it."

22 We have to say that the attitude of the RUC as

23 regarded by McLaughlan is somewhat confusing, if not

24 disingenuous, bearing in mind that the police were

25 clearly aware of McLaughlan's attendance at the meeting

6
 1 with the INLA on 28 April 1997, or else the RUC were

2 withholding their knowledge of McLaughlan's involvement.

3 There is further reference to the triumvirate in the

4 May 1998 entries, and in June there is a reference to

5 a conversation with Mr Maccabe. Then in August 1998,

6 there is further reference to the three men.

7 Again in August 1998, one finds the involvement of

8 Mr Mogg, Mr McLaughlan and Mr Maccabe in relation to

9 contacts with the INLA.

10 If I could point out the entry of 26 August 1998

11 where McLaughlan records:

12 "At one stage, I thought I was the only contact

13 between INLA and Government. Now I am not so sure."

14 This is of significance, in that it confirms the

15 spectre of another line of communication of which there

16 is no evidential record before this Inquiry. The Wright

17 family is extremely concerned that there is no record of

18 any product from this other line of communication with

19 the INLA by the NIO, and, therefore, no means of

20 examining the level of contact, the nature of the

21 contact, and the information received between April 1997

22 and December 1997.

23 The inextricable link between the INLA and IRSP has

24 never been challenged, and throughout the course of

25 these contacts it would appear that senior civil

7
 1 servants and members of the Prison Service, in our view,

2 have played somewhat fast and loose with paramilitary

3 organisations active and not on ceasefire.

4 I then deal with the question of hostage reports.

5 Following the hostage-taking, NIPS failed to interview

6 those officers at Maghaberry who were directly involved

7 and, in doing so, failed to elicit information about the

8 motives of McWilliams and Kenneway. Indeed, some of

9 those officers say reference was made to Billy Wright.

10 Crucially in his oral evidence, as Mr Johnson

11 reminded us, Alan Shannon admitted being aware of

12 speculation from Martin Mogg that Billy Wright was the

13 target of the hostage-taking. However, possessed of

14 this knowledge in April 1997, Alan Shannon waited until

15 November 1997 before reading Steve Davis' report about

16 how the firearms were smuggled into Maghaberry, a report

17 which had been submitted to Duncan McLaughlan in

18 mid-July 1997. No wonder Sir Richard Tilt described

19 this as "quite extraordinary".

20 Our conclusions in respect of the Northern Ireland

21 Prison Service are, among others, that in a properly

22 functioning prison Mr Wright would have benefited from

23 multiple layers of protection against the threat to his

24 life. The security environment at the Maze and its

25 ultimate management by NIPS had become so badly

8
 1 compromised as to deprive Mr Wright of many of the basic

2 operational and physical protections required to ensure

3 his personal safety.

4 By 27 December, Mr Wright's safety had already been

5 almost totally compromised and only the last few

6 vestiges of security measures at the prison were

7 remaining to prevent his murder. By taking a decision

8 to approve Mr Wright's transfer to the Maze,

9 Sir John Wheeler effectively placed Mr Wright into the

10 custody of an institution and a management, neither of

11 which were capable of fulfilling their duty of care in

12 respect of his personal safety.

13 The concept of corporate or collective

14 responsibility shared across Ministers, NIPS and prison

15 management appears to have been construed as a means to

16 allow individuals to avoid any sense of personal

17 responsibility. In the NIPS' written submission at

18 paragraph 316, it states that:

19 "Alan Shannon takes responsibility for all of his

20 actions and for all the decisions he took. He is not,

21 however, responsible for the conduct of his

22 subordinates, although NIPS is."

23 We say that Shannon was accountable for the

24 effective management of his subordinates, and, no matter

25 how attractive the idea may appear, Alan Shannon could

9
 1 not obtain the prestige, status and remuneration of

2 chief executive of the Prison Service, and yet, at the

3 same time, seek to divest himself of accountability for

4 the under-performance and systemic failings of NIPS.

5 It is difficult not to emerge with the impression

6 that the need to cover one's back was often foremost in

7 the calculations of Sir John Wheeler and Alan Shannon.

8 Mr Johnson made great play on how ministerial

9 responsibilities intended to work. Our comment is that

10 he seriously avoids the reality of what was happening in

11 1997, relying on the ministerial code of equal efficacy

12 as that which prevents MPs from having the tax funder

13 fund their moat-cleaning.

14 An inevitable and ultimately disastrous loss of

15 control was brought about by the prison authorities

16 themselves and sanctioned by Sir John Wheeler in their

17 ill-judged decision to allow 24-hour unlock from 1994

18 onwards. This was a serious blow, both in terms of

19 intelligence-gathering and control and it also afforded

20 a ready opportunity for prisoners to access the yard,

21 from which vulnerable roofs lay waiting.

22 Alan Shannon has, in the course of his oral evidence

23 to the Inquiry, accepted that numerous and significant

24 deficits existed within the security, control and

25 management apparatus and procedures in place both within

10
 1 NIPS and locally within Maze itself.

2 A lack of accountability and wanton disregard for

3 sound management practices created conditions within the

4 prison so appalling as to render HMP Maze unrecognisable

5 as a high security jail. It did, however, provide

6 a perfect backdrop which facilitated the murder of

7 Billy Wright by INLA terrorist murderers, with whom

8 there was disturbing ongoing contact by the

9 Governor I of Maghaberry Prison.

10 If I could then deal with the issues which arise in

11 chapter 6, and, for the avoidance of doubt, so that the

12 searching for oblique rebuttals is avoided, I want to

13 make the following express points in conjunction with

14 other points of rebuttal which will appear in the course

15 of my further submissions.

16 I deal, first of all, with the Security Services.

17 As far as SS01-0218 is concerned, we know it contains

18 threat intelligence but also seems tolerably clear, from

19 the evidence before the Inquiry and from those who have

20 seen the original document, that it contains more than

21 that. See page 182 of our submission, which tends to

22 indicate that the NIIR had a strategic significance.

23 We are concerned that the Security Services may be

24 trying to lever an unjust advantage by not fully

25 representing all that's contained within the NIIR.

11
 1 However, we do also understand the sensitivities

2 involved. We trust, however, that the Inquiry will

3 apply its knowledge to its analysis of the claim by the

4 Security Service witnesses that the NIIR had no wider

5 strategic implications.

6 Secondly, in the submissions by counsel for the

7 Security Services, the suggestion was made that, really,

8 source reports, the telex and T8X are all the same. We

9 do not necessarily accept that proposition, but we are

10 all somewhat in the dark concerning Security Services'

11 documentation.

12 Some light, however, is shed by looking momentarily

13 at the clear differences between a fax -- or is it

14 a telex -- at SS01-0252 and the more detailed

15 four-page source report at SS01-0260. If SS01-0252

16 could please be put on screen now. This may be a telex

17 or it may be a fax. We see clearly the nature and

18 content which is on this one-page document. It is not

19 necessary to consider the details, as the page itself is

20 self-explanatory in its format and content.

21 If we could then look at SS01-0260, please. If we

22 can go back perhaps -- perhaps that could be changed to

23 SS01-0352, please. Just keep going. Yes. SS01-0353,

24 we see what a source report looks like. We have page 1

25 here. Can we move to the next page and keep flicking

12
 1 through the pages, please? Then at page SS01-0357 we

2 have something which is called an intelligence report.

3 Perhaps that can be changed for the sake of the report

4 from 260 to 253, please.

5 That can be taken off the screen.

6 Thirdly, it was suggested that we wrongly criticised

7 HAG solely for not revealing his contacts with

8 Mr Shannon about the prison bugging issue. However, our

9 criticism at page 142 of our submission onwards relates

10 to the failure of HAG to brief the Minister.

11 Fourthly, the Security Services' submission relies

12 heavily on DCI2. It must be stressed that this witness

13 was not in post at the time and is, therefore, offering

14 no more than an informed opinion about what he feels

15 should have happened. This is an attempt at post-event

16 rationalisation. The key witness is, of course, DCI1,

17 who was in post in April 1997, and I will be referring

18 to his evidence in due course.

19 It is interesting to note that from page 63 onwards

20 of their written submissions Security Services make only

21 one reference to DCI1 and prefer to concentrate on the

22 more palatable evidence of DCI2. The views of DCI1 are

23 most uncomfortable for the Security Services, and,

24 rather than engage with those views, the Security

25 Services have treated him like the elephant in the room.

13
 1 We invite the Panel to conclude that this freezing

2 of their own witness, DCI1, is somewhat telling, and we

3 rely on the extrapolation contained in our written

4 submission of the evidence given by DCI1.

5 Fifthly, counsel for the Security Services said we

6 were wrong to assert that the Chief Constable had no

7 direct access to Ministers. Of course we accept he had

8 access, but the point we are making is that the

9 Chief Constable did not formally brief Ministers, which

10 was the responsibility of the Security Services in

11 matters of intelligence. The Security Services not only

12 had a duty to inform the police, but also to brief

13 Ministers and the Prison Service. We would rely on our

14 submissions at pages 139-145 and page 180 and 182.

15 David Wright is not saying this was a duty of the

16 Security Services, but witnesses, including DCI1, HAG,

17 Stephen Leach and DO3.

18 Sixthly, counsel for the Security Service is

19 reflecting page 26 of their written submissions,

20 indulging in his own little bit of revisionism. In

21 taking issue by the use by ourselves of the word

22 "emphatic" in respect of the Minister's assertion that

23 he had not received the information in a request of the

24 Panel. The request was, before reaching such

25 a conclusion, the Panel should be careful how they could

14
 1 say with certainty, on a topic like that, so many years

2 after the event, that something might have happened or

3 didn't happen. Sir Geoffrey indicated he was not

4 putting it any higher. We would suggest that, given

5 this theory was never explored with the Minister, that

6 there is no evidential basis for it and it is something

7 of a flight of fancy which was never, and should never,

8 become airborne.

9 Turning now to submissions made both in writing and

10 on behalf of the PSNI orally by Mr Brangam, Mr Brangam

11 ridiculed at considerable emotional length a submission

12 made on behalf of the Wright family. He referred to it

13 as the stuff of a very poor crime novel. We welcome his

14 late acknowledgment concerning the commission of

15 a crime.

16 More seriously, on reading the PSNI written

17 submission and on listening to Mr Brangam, one could be

18 given for thinking they were at an Inquiry of their own

19 and certainly not the one attended by the rest of us for

20 152 days. Their submission is more akin to a fairy tale

21 and rather facetiously the title of "Alva in Wonderland"

22 springs to mind; or perhaps, like the Prison Service, it

23 has more of the characteristics of a circus.

24 Their assertion at page 3 of the submission that

25 there are no grounds to criticise any member of the RUC

15
 1 for any action or inaction that effectively facilitated

2 the murder of Billy Wright would be an attempt to

3 imitate the illusionist. Mr Brangam's assertion that

4 the April events were free-standing and not connected to

5 the death of Billy Wright is in complete contradiction

6 to the views of the author of the police reply to the

7 position paper, namely Chief Superintendent McCombe, who

8 described the April events as:

9 "A precursor to the murder of Billy Wright."

10 The conflict is apparent. Mr Brangam who, with

11 reluctance, had to accept that:

12 "We are not in a position to dispute the NIIR,"

13 that's the April NIIR, "was dispatched", and went on to

14 describe the situation as something which was "awkward,

15 embarrassing and less than optimum".

16 It sounds very much like the trapeze artist whose

17 fall was equally awkward, embarrassing and less than

18 optimum and which resulted in substantial corporal

19 injury.

20 Mr Brangam then, in the course of his submissions,

21 tried to have us believe that, in fact, the INLA did not

22 order the Wright murder. The three performing monkeys

23 have arrived in the circus ring: hear no evil, see no

24 evil, do no evil. What a pity that, a bit like the

25 Intrep, certain items can come back to haunt.

16
 1 Those items include SS01-0328, firearms report on

2 murder weapons. Paragraph 3:

3 "This weapon has been used on one previous occasion

4 on 30 September 1997 in an INLA punishment shooting."

5 Province executive committee meeting on

6 7 January 1998. Those present were: the

7 Chief Constable, the Deputy Chief Constable, the Head of

8 Special Branch, the Head of IMG and three Assistant

9 Chief Constables with the DCI and GOC at MD01-0448. The

10 meeting reports as follows at MD01-0452:

11 "The Republican movement gave tacit approval for the

12 INLA murder of Billy Wright. PIRA are not likely to

13 dwell on the overall overwhelming success of the INLA

14 operation, in light of their own failures to deal with

15 Wright."

16 At paragraph 18:

17 "The IRA were overjoyed with the success of their

18 Maze operation which resulted in the demise of

19 Billy Wright."

20 At SS01-0323:

21 "The INLA statement on the execution of Billy Wright

22 was issued by the Socialist Republican publicity bureau.

23 The INLA claim responsibility for the execution of 'King

24 Rat', Billy Wright."

25 In his Newsnight interview at NP41-0152 McWilliams

17
 1 said:

2 "I was under the strict control and discipline of

3 the INLA."

4 Special Branch comment at PS01-0252 subtitled

5 "Recent murders carried out by INLA". It says:

6 "Recent murders carried out by INLA were set up and

7 sanctioned by PIRA."

8 It continues. SB comment:

9 "The recent murders were those of Billy Wright and

10 Jim Guiney."

11 On 9 March 1998, Security Service report at

12 SS01-0345:

13 "INLA carried out the murders of Billy Wright and

14 Jim Guiney."

15 Special Branch report at PS01-1000:

16 "The murder of Billy Wright was planned and

17 authorise given for the hit by 2-IC INLA."

18 The written submission at page 19 onwards floats the

19 unsubstantiated by evidence theory that those advising

20 the Minister warned him of the INLA threat and this

21 provided the explanation for the decision not to

22 transfer Billy Wright on 22 April. They then went on to

23 say the Minister was told the groups would be segregated

24 and therefore reversed the decision to transfer

25 Billy Wright.

18
 1 For once, we are in agreement with counsel for the

2 Minister that this was wishful thinking by the police.

3 One might say there is an air of desperation about

4 the police submission that Sir John Wheeler could not

5 have been told of this intelligence. Why is that? The

6 answer is obvious. They are trying to downplay the

7 significance of their failure to action SS01-0218. They

8 are attempting to claim that if the Minister was told

9 and still went ahead with the transfer, it confirms the

10 insignificance of this intelligence and lessens the

11 chances of them being publicly blamed for facilitating

12 the death of Billy Wright but not actioning this

13 intelligence. They can say the intelligence was

14 discounted by the Minister and so their omission was

15 not, in the scheme of things, all that important.

16 How much weight should be attached to their claim?

17 Well, firstly, they, like all other parties, had the

18 opportunity to put to the Minister their theory that he

19 had been told this information but may have forgotten.

20 They may not like it being pointed out, but they did not

21 do so and that should count against them.

22 Then if we look at their shifting position, and this

23 was dealt with during the course of this week, we

24 remember their different descriptions as to whether or

25 not he got this information floating from "most likely"

19
 1 to "high likelihood" to "a mere possibility".

2 Both in the written submissions from PSNI and in the

3 oral submissions we have the unedifying spectacle of

4 senior counsel for the Police Service of

5 Northern Ireland representing the old RUC relying on an

6 unsubstantiated, unverified and anonymous Republican

7 blog from a character known as "willy.g". The

8 authorship of this particular article is similar to and

9 of equal value to that of an old Scottish character

10 known as "Oor Wullie". The police seem to have learned

11 nothing from the experience of what happened when

12 reliance was placed on promises made by Republicans of

13 the IRA variety as occurred within the Maze Prison and

14 the "no first strike" policy.

15 The attempted illusion continued when Mr Brangam

16 indicated on page 20 of LiveNote:

17 "Our position is clear. We had no knowledge of the

18 pre-emptive strike against Billy Wright."

19 This is an attempted spin on their own predicament.

20 Most people who have heard the evidence would regard

21 this information contained in SS01-0218 as pre-emptive

22 intelligence, but, for obvious reasons, the police don't

23 want to categorise it as such. They speculate on their

24 written submission that perhaps AH was phoning for

25 a chat about something unusual rather than relaying

20
 1 urgent threat intelligence. What a pity there is

2 nothing on the face of the record to suggest this was

3 put to the witness.

4 They then continue with the illusion at page 66 of

5 their written submission that an E3 witness who was not

6 called did, in fact, receive the NIIR and raised some

7 discussion about it, but again, this is devoid of any

8 evidential basis. Yet again, another incredible

9 explanation which is proffered in their desperate

10 efforts to downplay the significance of their failure to

11 action the SS01-0218 intelligence.

12 Then we turn to one that will make, I think, even

13 Alistair Campbell blush. At page 27 Mr Brangam went out

14 on a limb and suggested, while accepting there was no

15 evidence -- and this is from someone who gave us all

16 a lecture on the evidential essentials for

17 a prosecution, but he suggests that, while accepting

18 there was no evidence to back it up:

19 "The purpose of the agent telling H about a threat

20 in 1997 may have been because INLA were opposed to the

21 threat. So the agent throws in the threat to stop the

22 move."

23 What an utterly preposterous suggestion, breaking it

24 down. An agent reporting at great risk to his life

25 against INLA members decides he, too, is opposed to

21
 1 the Billy Wright transfer. He is aware that Ministers

2 and officials are deliberating about the transfer of

3 Wright to H6. They are calibrating the scales and

4 decides he will tilt the balance against the transfer by

5 inventing this threat to block the transfer, believing

6 this will impact on ministerial decisions, as he, of

7 course, is aware that this intelligence will go directly

8 to Sir John Wheeler.

9 It smacks of pure desperation by the police to avoid

10 the finger of blame and their submissions must be

11 treated by extreme caution by this Inquiry in light of

12 this obvious desperation.

13 Well might Mr Brangam couch his remarks by accepting

14 there was no evidence.

15 Finally, an attempted explanation is offered whereby

16 Mr Brangam for the first time attempts to explain what

17 went wrong on the part of the police.

18 We repeatedly said that no clear explanation had

19 been advanced by the RUC for their failure to action the

20 NIIR -- less than optimum, to put it charitably -- and

21 examined several potential explanations at page 164 of

22 our written submission. One of those quoted was ZBH

23 whom we reported said:

24 "On many occasions I would not have read a NIIR in

25 detail if I recognised the information."

22
 1 Mr Brangam has now disclosed publicly for the first

2 time what the police say went wrong. He challenged

3 Sir Geoffrey's claim that it was the content, not the

4 form, that counts. On page 22 he ties in with ZBH and

5 says NIIRs were viewed as primarily historic documents."

6 Then at page 24:

7 "The inaction of the RUC is easily explained by the

8 nature of the communication."

9 Not the content, but the nature.

10 Such a comment on behalf of the Police Service is

11 not only glib, but alarming. It is of no comfort to

12 Mr Wright. Effectively, Special Branch are saying

13 unless a piece of intelligence comes on a certain piece

14 of paper, then they don't do anything about it.

15 Dealing with three miscellaneous points, we did not

16 say the RUC downgraded the intelligence. We examined

17 this theory, as we were entitled to, and asked: was that

18 why the intelligence was not actioned?

19 At pages 170-171 of our submission we rejected this

20 proposition. One has to remember that we, representing

21 the Wright family, have throughout the course of this

22 Inquiry been at somewhat of a disadvantage and,

23 therefore, have had to enquire, probe and challenge all

24 angles potentially open to us, but that does not mean we

25 are asserting that they are our propositions.

23
 1 Further, we did not assert positively that the

2 Security Services had buried the information on the

3 police computer. We explored this as a possibility and

4 rejected that, as can clearly be seen from a proper

5 reading of our submission at page 163 where we

6 positively assert that RUC addressees did receive the

7 NIIR.

8 In respect of the submission on behalf of

9 Special Branch officers, the role of Witness ZBE was

10 discussed and his non-appearance. At the time we made

11 our submissions, we were unaware that he was actually

12 physically and mentally ill. Further, we were never

13 told by the Inquiry of a draft statement and we have

14 never seen such a draft. This all occurred very

15 recently. We are not in a position, in those

16 circumstances, to say more.

17 It is not just on the likely, highly likely or

18 possible briefing of the Minister that the police

19 submission exhibits wishful thinking. That wishful

20 thinking is in all of the key points. This trait

21 manifests itself. The written and oral submissions do

22 not reflect the evidence before this Inquiry. The

23 Inquiry must make its decision on the evidence, not what

24 the police would like the evidence to be.

25 If could I then move to chapter 6, which deals with

24
 1 the issue of intelligence and the roles of the RUC,

2 Security Services and the army.

3 Dealing first with SS01-0218, central to the Inquiry

4 is a document described as a summary of Security Service

5 intelligence documents relating to the INLA threat

6 against Billy Wright. It is a summary of three

7 documents: a contact note dated 21 April, a telex dated

8 22 April and a NIIR dated 24 April, provided to the

9 Inquiry by the Security Services. These documents have

10 been seen by the Inquiry Panel.

11 They show what has been set out at page 122

12 concerning the stance taken by the INLA prisoners of the

13 Maze Prison who were strongly opposed to the proposed

14 transfer of Billy Wright, that the INLA intended to kill

15 Billy Wright at the first opportunity if he were to be

16 transferred to the H Block 6 at the Maze, the likely

17 method of attack and that the INLA leadership were aware

18 of the threat to Billy Wright.

19 SS01-0218 records that this information was passed

20 by the Security Services' agent handler orally to

21 RUC E3A on 21 April 1997. It was then said to have been

22 sent by the Security Services agent handler AH by telex

23 to the desk officer, DO2, in the Security Services

24 Assessments Group on 27 April 1997 with a request to

25 issue it to RUC E3A in writing. This information was

25
 1 recorded as having been passed by DO2 by means of a NIIR

2 on 24 April 1997 to a number of addressees in the RUC.

3 Accordingly, at least eight RUC officers, if not

4 more, were listed as recipients of this NIIR. It was

5 also passed to the Security Services staff

6 representative at Police Headquarters. There

7 a manuscript written by DO2 on 25 April 1997, which

8 apparently confirms the information having been passed

9 to the RUC, is requested. The question must be asked:

10 did the Security Services receive this information?

11 The agent was considered by the Security Services to

12 be reliable. The normal procedure was to compose

13 a source report and then a contact note. A NIIR would

14 be produced for external customers such as police or

15 Ministers. The Inquiry has seen the contact note

16 showing AH spoke to the agent on 21 April 1997. AH has

17 testified on two occasions to that effect and no party

18 has sought to challenge that account, let alone produce

19 evidence to the contrary.

20 The contact note indicated from where the agent was

21 getting his information. Critically, PSNI did not

22 dispute that AH received this intelligence. Was the

23 agent who provided the information reliable? AH

24 indicated that the source was in a position to report on

25 more than 50% of individuals within INLA. The Security

26
 1 Services Assessments Group believed the intelligence

2 from the source was worth having and that substantially

3 higher than 50% of the source's information proved to be

4 accurate.

5 There is nothing in particular about the secondary

6 source of the information causing the Security Services

7 concern. The agent reported faithfully what he had been

8 told by a person with whom he had a long relationship.

9 That person apparently talked to him about INLA activity

10 in the past and such information had been corroborated

11 by the Security Services. He had no reason to believe

12 the agent was not telling the truth on this particular

13 occasion regarding the threat to Billy Wright.

14 Subsequent events would prove the accuracy of this

15 agent's information. The RUC were said to be recipients

16 of this agent's information. Significantly, there was

17 no direct criticism by the PSNI or any officers of this

18 agent's reliability or the value of his reporting.

19 In 1996/1997 this agent's information was confirmed

20 by the RUC as being accurate. This was at no stage

21 disputed by the PSNI.

22 AH also produced to the Inquiry a note of

23 a telephone conversation between him and FG in relation

24 to Prison Officers being taken hostage. The agent

25 reported this incident was in connection with

27
 1 Billy Wright. This was initially rubbished by FG.

2 However, after checking, he phoned back and said there

3 might be some truth in the source's report. AH

4 concluded this note by saying:

5 "FG did not check his facts before refuting source

6 report."

7 This does not reflect well upon FG. The family of

8 Mr Wright would submit FG should be the subject of

9 criticism for disregarding valuable and correct

10 intelligence and not revising or indeed revisiting his

11 opinion.

12 Again, it must be stressed that at no time during

13 two appearances by AH did the RUC/PSNI directly

14 challenge the reliability, access to top level secret

15 INLA information and accuracy of this agent's reporting,

16 whose warning should not only have been disseminated

17 into the respective intelligence systems but should not

18 have gone unheeded by any State agency.

19 Have the Security Services provided all

20 documentation relevant to this information? AH claimed

21 that no source report or the equivalent of a source

22 report was created from this intelligence. Is this

23 credible with such significant intelligence? Source

24 reports were more detailed than contact notes, as they

25 included the intelligence, the context and comment that

28
 1 would then be circulated by the Security Services. In

2 response to his own counsel he said, in relation to

3 being informed of the presence of firearms in the

4 prison:

5 "It could never be the case that contact notes and

6 other records were not made following contact with

7 an agent."

8 Yet, despite this response, it is of concern that no

9 source report exists in relation to this significant

10 intelligence.

11 This witness was also questioned by former Inquiry

12 Counsel, Mr Batchelor. He was referred to SS01-0240,

13 where AH stated his source on two occasions reported:

14 "There was growing discontent among INLA prisoners

15 concerning Billy Wright's transfer to the Maze."

16 Mr Batchelor asked AH did that mean there was

17 another document which the Inquiry did not have, but AH

18 denied it meant that. He was asked to explain his

19 comments that a source provided a number of reports

20 warning of increasing INLA concerns at the relocation of

21 the LVF and that the source had also provided

22 pre-emptive intelligence that INLA in the prison were in

23 possession of weapons.

24 Mr Batchelor suggested a number of reports meant

25 more than two and the Inquiry had only one document that

29
 1 related to the specific INLA threat against Wright.

2 There is no reference to the increasing concerns in the

3 document summarised in SS01-0218.

4 The same witness was involved in the collection of

5 the intelligence in SS01-0358. The family harbour

6 concerns on this aspect of AH's evidence. The contact

7 note in the Inquiry's possession related to a telephone

8 conversation between AH and the agent, which concludes

9 with AH saying:

10 "The meeting tomorrow will be interesting."

11 Yet the contact note for the next day's interesting

12 meeting is missing. AH said if contact notes were

13 taken, they were not retained. According to the

14 Security Services' letter, SS01-0395, contact notes

15 would be stored on an agent's file held securely within

16 T8. No satisfactory reason was offered for that gap and

17 raises suspicions on the part of the family.

18 He was asked to confirm that there has not been

19 produced any record of a conversation between him and

20 E3A on 21 April 1997 and he confirmed that there is no

21 record of such a conversation. AH was shown document

22 SS01-0352, which is a Security Services document sent

23 directly to the RUC Regional Support Unit in 1996 by the

24 Security Services detailing the threat to

25 Kevin McAlorum. The document was described by AH as

30
 1 a T8X. Whatever they are called, it is hard to believe

2 the source report or equivalent document did not exist

3 in April 1997. No such document relating to this

4 specific INLA threat has been disclosed to the Inquiry

5 by the Security Services.

6 A source report is a much more detailed document

7 than a mere contact note. Source reports were available

8 for internal transmission within the Security Service

9 prior to April 1997, which raises forcefully the

10 question why one was not sent to Assessments Group by AH

11 at that time, given the importance of this intelligence.

12 When he first gave evidence, he said that:

13 "Included in the material generally supplied to the

14 Assessments Group was a T8X."

15 And he confirmed that the source report would go to

16 the Assessments Group. When challenged, he then

17 conceded that:

18 "At one stage, source reports were sent to the

19 Assessments Group."

20 This shifting of position raises doubts in the minds

21 of the Wright family about the truthfulness of AH.

22 Before AH concluded his evidence, it was, in fact,

23 pointed out to him that the Inquiry had uncovered

24 a source report sent by him and copied to the police in

25 May 1997. AH replied, we say somewhat weakly, that he

31
 1 didn't know precisely when this system had changed, only

2 that it was in the process of evolution at that point.

3 Former ACC Kincaid said he would have expected to

4 find a note of the telephone call between the Security

5 Services and the E3A desk officer on 21 April 1997 and

6 was surprised to find none, as the Service was normally

7 meticulous in their record-keeping. He believed this

8 phone call was important, as it may have explained what

9 action was to be taken by the police and Security

10 Services on this intelligence.

11 Apparently, the front of the 24 April NIIR was

12 marked "clearance own" meaning the Security Services had

13 a veto on the information going out and the form of

14 words had to be agreed with them before the intelligence

15 could be passed on.

16 No such telephone record, attendance note has been

17 produced to the Inquiry and AH said none was made, which

18 is surprising to say the least. The conundrum may

19 arise: did the intelligence go out as suggested by AH?

20 Did the intelligence never leave at the time and in the

21 manner suggested? Any determination by this Inquiry

22 that this intelligence critical to the life of

23 Billy Wright was not properly disseminated and handled

24 would inevitably lead to a finding that a State agent,

25 be it RUC or Security Services, facilitated the death of

32
 1 Billy Wright.

2 Dealing then with DO2 and the source report, this

3 theme was further developed with the Security Services

4 officer known as DO2, who was based with the Assessments

5 Group. She confirmed that the information she put in

6 this NIIR, SS01-0218, was telexed to her in the format

7 of a source report and that's what she would have called

8 it. She also confirmed that in the ten-month period

9 prior to April 1997, she would have received information

10 that she was to pass on by way of a NIIR via source

11 reports on previous occasions. In answer to the

12 Chairman, she indicated that she couldn't recall seeing

13 the contact note at the time in this case. "I would

14 have thought that it would have been a source report",

15 she said.

16 Counsel for the Security Services acting on

17 instructions indicated that the source report, the T8X

18 report and the telex are all one and the same in respect

19 of the terms of context and that one or other of those

20 words might be used in respect of something that was in

21 a different format. I have already dealt in some

22 measure with that earlier. The Wright family do not

23 accept that a telex could be described as a source

24 report and considers there has not been full disclosure

25 by the Security Services of all relevant documents in

33
 1 their possession.

2 It is our belief the Security Services have failed

3 to provide documents to the Inquiry. As set out at

4 page 131, they include source report for April 1997,

5 INLA threat intelligence, a note of any telephone

6 conversation that took place in April 1997 between the

7 agent handler and the RUC desk officer, source reports

8 concerning growing discontent among INLA prisoners and

9 pre-emptive intelligence relating to the Maghaberry

10 hostage incident and a contact note for the second

11 contact between AH and the agent in January 1998. The

12 Wright family do not find the explanations for missing

13 documents advanced by the Security Services to be

14 satisfactory and do not believe the Security Services

15 have cooperated fully with the Inquiry and have

16 obstructed the Inquiry by with holding relevant

17 documentation.

18 In this context, we would submit that AH and the

19 Security Services should be the subject of criticism.

20 Did the Security Services pass this information to the

21 relevant NIO Minister? The importance of this question

22 rests with the fact that, as intelligence came into the

23 Security Services that INLA were intending to kill

24 Billy Wright, Sir John Wheeler was at the same time

25 wrestling with the problem of where to locate

34
 1 Billy Wright.

2 Whilst there can be no doubt that the RUC had

3 primacy in the anti-terrorism battle in

4 Northern Ireland, it was the Security Services who had

5 the responsibility for briefing the NIO Ministers and

6 officials as well as the Cabinet Office in London. The

7 Security Services delivered information by hand to the

8 Minister and the Minister had meetings with DCI and HAG.

9 The terms of reference for the DCI formally stated that

10 the DCI Northern Ireland was responsible to the

11 Secretary of State of Northern Ireland as his principal

12 adviser on intelligence matters.

13 At paragraph 2 of his statement DCI commented:

14 "Through the Assessments Group I would provide the

15 Secretary of State, Ministers and other Whitehall

16 customers with a flow of intelligence that met their

17 requirements.

18 "It was not the formal intelligence function of the

19 police or army to brief the Minister."

20 DCI also said the channel for the provision of

21 intelligence was the NIIR. It is also notable that at

22 no time during the course of the Inquiry have the

23 Service challenged RUC witnesses that it was the

24 police's duty to brief Ministers on intelligence.

25 Four days after the State received information of

35
 1 INLA's intention to murder Billy Wright in the

2 Maze Prison, the State at its highest level in

3 Northern Ireland decided to transfer him to that prison

4 and co-locate him in an H Block with INLA prisoners. It

5 was to the Assessment Group that the intelligence and

6 the threat to Billy Wright's life was sent on

7 22 April 1997. A number of desk officers were involved

8 in drafting and checking the NIIR which was based upon

9 that information. They were DO2 and DO3, the Supervisor

10 or line manager was HAG.

11 The issue of what did the Minister know must be

12 explored. The question is: did the Minister know of

13 this threat intelligence and does the evidence before

14 the Inquiry point to or away from such ministerial

15 knowledge?

16 It was highly unusual for a Minister of the Crown to

17 be involved in deciding where one prisoner should be

18 located, but there were a number of reasons, including

19 Billy Wright's standing, the involvement of Members of

20 Parliament and the Irish Government officials involved

21 in secretarial meetings with their British counterparts.

22 Sir John said that the dilemma facing the NIO was

23 the progress of the political process and the

24 maintenance of the ceasefire against the effective

25 management of the prison system and the treatment of

36
 1 Billy Wright. Under cross-examination he said he could

2 not, at this distance in time, advise the Inquiry what

3 the security intelligence information was.

4 It is unsatisfactory that not one civil servant,

5 politician or adviser with responsibility for security

6 has been able, either from recollection or

7 documentation, to properly explain to the Inquiry what

8 exactly was the security intelligence information

9 examined by Sir John Wheeler on 22 April 1997.

10 In any event the legitimate question that arises is:

11 with the Security Services having knowledge of the INLA

12 murder plot on 21 April 1997, was it the case that the

13 security intelligence information provided to the

14 Minister on 22 April 1997 related to the INLA murder

15 plot?

16 Sir John was questioned about the information

17 carrying the INLA threat to Billy Wright and indicated

18 that he had no recollection of receiving it, that, as

19 a general principle, information came to him in writing

20 but that meetings with the DCI may not necessarily have

21 a written documentary record. Sir John expressly

22 denied -- and that is important to note -- having

23 received the NIIR, which on being presented to him

24 caused him to state:

25 "The answer to that is no. I am reading this

37
 1 information with, frankly, some astonishment. If this

2 had come to my notice, as Minister, in April 1997, here

3 is a specific statement that INLA intended to kill

4 Billy Wright, if that information had come to me, as

5 a Minister, I think the Panel would have understood

6 exactly how I would have reacted. I would have asked

7 the Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland

8 Prison Service 'What are you going to do about this?'.

9 It is quite unacceptable that a prisoner's life should

10 have been risked in this way."

11 There are two issues pertinent to the handling of

12 intelligence with political aspects such as this. There

13 is downward dissemination to the RUC, who should then

14 warn the individual of the threat to their life. There

15 is also, however, upward dissemination from the Security

16 Services to the Minister.

17 In relation to SS01-0220 which referred to the UVF's

18 intention to attack Prison Officers, we see that it was

19 sent to the Assessments Group by the RUC. The

20 Assessments Group then created a NIIR and passed that on

21 to the Minister. It places the burden squarely on the

22 Security Service as being responsible for briefing the

23 Minister. In this instance, the information was

24 actually collected by the Security Services, so there

25 could be no confusion or equivocation, or so it would

38
 1 appear.

2 Evidence has been given both by DO2 and DO3, who

3 were involved in the creation and distribution of the

4 NIIR and who confirmed that Sir John Wheeler's office

5 was not included in the distribution list for the NIIR.

6 Is it possible the intelligence information was imparted

7 to Sir John Wheeler orally? There would appear to be

8 two individuals who had direct access to the Minister,

9 DCI and HAG. DCI stated:

10 "To have reported new intelligence to Ministers

11 outside the NIIR system would not have been

12 appropriate."

13 DCI was asked:

14 "Question: Can you envisage a situation where

15 information of this nature, the INLA threat to

16 Billy Wright, which was within Security Services'

17 record, would not have been disseminated by way of

18 a NIIR to the Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland

19 Prison Service?

20 "Answer: No, absolutely not."

21 This evidence from someone of the status of DCI1

22 completely undermines the claims made at page 85 of the

23 Security Services' written submission.

24 Mr Alan Shannon was not on the distribution list of

25 the NIIR and said that this information had not been

39
 1 passed to him.

2 When asked what the security intelligence

3 information was that Sir John Wheeler had read, DCI said

4 he did not know what the security information was and

5 speculated weakly that it was possible that the

6 Chief Constable could have briefed the Security Minister

7 directly and thus bypassed the Security Services.

8 He could offer, however, no concrete evidence of

9 that ever having happened. It was firmly rejected by

10 the then Chief Constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan.

11 Furthermore, it was never suggested by

12 Sir John Wheeler at any time that he would have received

13 briefings directly from the Chief Constable on

14 intelligence matters. On the balance of probabilities,

15 and if not beyond doubt, it is clear that the Security

16 Services were not just the principal conduit, but the

17 only conduit, for formal intelligence briefings of the

18 Minister.

19 Should the Minister have been told of this

20 information? The DCI said or agreed that the Minister

21 clearly should have had that, and, indeed, the officials

22 who were advising him. DCI specifically stated it

23 wasn't passed. The intelligence wasn't passed to the

24 Minister or the Secretary of State. That's correct as

25 a matter of fact.

40
 1 The DCI accepted that there was clearly a gap

2 between the discussions about the move of Billy Wright

3 and the threat intelligence. He testified that

4 a different distribution list for the NIIR at a stroke

5 would have brought together those who had visibility of

6 the one issue, the transfer, and those who had access to

7 the intelligence. He thought the mismatch arose because

8 there was policy discussion about an area outside the

9 normal remit of the Security Services, that is prison

10 transfer activity, and intelligence relating to one

11 individual.

12 However, there was one person within the Security

13 Services who was in a position to marry up the two

14 strands of documentation. As that person was involved

15 in the discussions regarding the transfer of

16 Billy Wright to the Maze, he had access to the Minister

17 and was aware of the threat intelligence that the NIIR

18 was generated by the group led by him. That individual

19 was HAG. It is clear the information was not passed to

20 the Minister according to the oral testimony given to

21 this Inquiry. This has been conceded by DCI.

22 It is significant that when Sir John Wheeler gave

23 evidence that at no stage was he challenged by the

24 Security Services on his assertion he had not received

25 this information from them. Nor was it put to Sir John

41
 1 he may have received this information from HAG. Both

2 DCI and Sir John are agreed that this intelligence

3 should have passed to the Minister. This is a critical

4 omission on the part of the Security Services, as, had

5 this information been in the possession of the Minister,

6 it could well have resulted in a different decision

7 about the transfer of Billy Wright or the conditions in

8 which he was to be kept.

9 In short, the murder may not have occurred. For the

10 submission, the Security Services should be the subject

11 of criticism and an adverse determination for failing to

12 pass on this information which could have resulted in

13 saving Billy Wright's life rather than ultimately

14 facilitating it.

15 If the Minister did not receive this information

16 from the Security Services, what is the explanation for

17 this omission? Attempting to provide an explanation why

18 the NIIR was sent to RUC addressees but not copied to

19 the Security Minister, NIO or Prison Service, DO3

20 attempted to suggest this was because the intelligence

21 was tactical, not strategic. She was later driven from

22 this position and reverted to what has become the

23 Security Services' mantra, that it didn't matter anyway

24 as it was the police's job to act on this intelligence.

25 This is not an acceptable answer, nor does it excuse

42
 1 the failure of the Security Services to carry out their

2 responsibility for briefing Government Ministers.

3 At the heart of this controversy is the senior MI5

4 officer known as HAG. His unit received intelligence on

5 both Loyalist and Republican factions from the RUC,

6 army, and the Services' own agent handlers, and then

7 issued NIIRs, and was responsible for briefing Ministers

8 in both Belfast and London. It was at the crossroads of

9 intelligence dissemination in Northern Ireland.

10 In 1997, HAG was in charge of this unit. When HAG

11 first gave evidence, nowhere in his statement did he

12 volunteer that he had direct and personal involvement in

13 some of the most important intelligence issues facing

14 the Billy Wright Inquiry.

15 Further, it was only nine months after he gave

16 evidence that it emerged unexpectedly through the

17 testimony of Alan Shannon that in September 1997 HAG had

18 accompanied two RUC officers to a meeting with

19 Mr Shannon to discuss the possibility of mounting

20 a technical eavesdropping operation against Billy Wright

21 in the Maze Prison. A review of his role was prompted

22 by this unexpected disclosure.

23 We say that understanding this sequence of events

24 undermines the suggestion that somehow or other HAG was

25 ambushed as asserted at page 14 of the written

43
 1 submission of the Security Services.

2 DCI had attempted to explain the failure in the old

3 "the left hand didn't know what the right hand was

4 doing" argument. However, HAG was the one person about

5 whom this could not be said, as he was uniquely in

6 possession of both strands of information. Equally, he

7 was aware that the Minister was debating where to locate

8 Prisoner Wright as early as 11 April 1997. According to

9 NIO official Mr Leach, HAG:

10 "Question: He would have been aware --

11 "Answer: Yes.

12 "Question: -- that the Minister should --

13 "Answer: Yes.

14 "Question: -- would need intelligence?

15 "Answer: Yes."

16 That was his reply in answer to a question on this

17 issue.

18 Furthermore, HAG was on the distribution list for

19 two separate NIO, NIPS distribution lists in April 1997

20 discussing the transfer of Billy Wright. Eleven days

21 later, Assessments Group is informed of the INLA murder

22 plot and HAG personally is aware of it around that time.

23 Yet nowhere in the evidence before the Inquiry is there

24 anything to show he advised the Minister of this

25 intelligence. Worse than that, it is clear that HAG was

44
 1 one of the few MI5 officers with direct access to the

2 Minister. According to DCI:

3 "I or Assessments Group regularly talked through the

4 issues with NIO colleagues."

5 He said:

6 "Assessments Group prepared periodic intelligence

7 briefings for Sir John Wheeler."

8 The proposition that Assessments Group staff were

9 not sufficiently familiar with NIPS' structures to

10 deliver the intelligence quickly is as feeble as it is

11 incredible.

12 During evidence on 2 February 2009, HAG said he

13 would have met Sir John Wheeler fairly regularly and

14 given him an oral briefing on the current intelligence

15 picture, including discussions about Billy Wright and

16 his intentions, and in those discussions there may or

17 may not have been a suggestion about what would have

18 happened if Billy Wright had moved to the Maze Prison.

19 HAG was pressed as to his reaction after the murder

20 and was asked, did it not cross his mind, nine months

21 after the murder, that in April 1997 he knew of the

22 threat, he knew the Minister was involved in the

23 transfer discussions and he had brought it to the

24 attention of the Minister's officials what would happen

25 if he were to be moved. He was asked did that not cross

45
 1 his mind in January 1998 after the murder. His answer

2 was:

3 "It did not cross my mind."

4 He revealed during his evidence that the Security

5 Services met regularly with Sir John Wheeler and there

6 was quite a lot of information about the difficulties

7 that were likely to arise if Billy Wright was

8 transferred to the Maze. When asked repeatedly during

9 questioning if he raised with Alan Shannon in any of his

10 meetings the threats to Billy Wright's safety, he

11 retreated behind the Security Services' mantra, that

12 threat assessments against individuals were the

13 responsibility of the RUC.

14 In answer to his own counsel, HAG said:

15 "We were there to disseminate intelligence

16 information that might be of interest to Ministers and

17 might help to inform the decision-making."

18 This is a damning admission, as there can be no

19 argument that this information was of interest to

20 Sir John Wheeler when he was deliberating upon the

21 Billy Wright transfer.

22 Finally, in answer to Bishop Oliver's question:

23 "Question: But did you actually see every NIIR and

24 read it in retrospect?"

25 He answered:

46
 1 "Answer: I did."

2 The Wright family view of this witness is that he

3 was an unconvincing witness who failed to provide full

4 disclosure to the Inquiry and withheld information on

5 his first appearance at the Inquiry.

6 Secondly, they are of the view that there was

7 a particular onus resting on this individual to ensure

8 that the Minister was made aware of the INLA threat and

9 the NIIR sent to him by the group that he supervised.

10 Yet, despite being offered the opportunity to make

11 a second witness statement, he made no mention of having

12 briefed the Minister about this intelligence. He

13 suggested vaguely he may have told the Minister of this

14 intelligence and his claim was not supported by any of

15 his colleagues in their evidence and was effectively

16 refuted strongly by Sir John. Indeed, the claim by HAG

17 cuts across the strict briefing procedures laid down.

18 The witness, we say, was not credible on this point,

19 and it is clear that intelligence was withheld from the

20 Minister.

21 HAG was accused of being the person in possession

22 both of the information regarding the transfer and the

23 INLA desire to murder him. The family do not resile

24 from that accusation and state that the actions of this

25 individual amount to collusion as failing to warn the

47
 1 Minister of a real and imminent danger and taking steps

2 to prevent that danger.

3 Further, and equally concerning to the family, is

4 that he met with the chief executive of the

5 Prison Service on at least two occasions after receiving

6 this intelligence and all he could say was:

7 "Not my responsibility" when challenged.

8 It was his responsibility as a senior Security

9 Services official of the State to protect the lives of

10 all of its citizens, and by his conduct and own words he

11 abdicated that responsibility that came to the life of

12 Billy Wright.

13 We say that this individual has behaved

14 irresponsibly. His conduct defies all logic. When

15 coupled with his less than candid evidence to the

16 Inquiry, this suggests he is a person who has something

17 to hide. The family believe that what he has done

18 amounts to collusive and facilitating conduct and he

19 should be the subject of criticism.

20 Dealing with Security Services' links to the

21 Prison Service, the first point to be made is they

22 didn't even have to deliver the intelligence quickly, as

23 eight months passed from the receipt of the intelligence

24 to the murder.

25 Revelations of secret meetings demonstrated

48
 1 a personal relationship between HAG and the

2 Prison Service Chief Executive. HAG had direct access

3 to Mr Shannon. Like the Minister, however, he kept

4 Mr Shannon in the dark.

5 Further criticism of HAG and the Service comes from

6 the fact that it was his representatives who attended

7 five PLG meetings with the Prison Service between

8 April 1997 and the murder. More damningly, at not one

9 of those meetings did the Service advise senior NIPS

10 officials of this significant intelligence.

11 One must wonder on a more sinister level what it

12 says about the attitude of a State agency to the life of

13 Billy Wright.

14 In his report Judge Cory considered this issue and

15 said that:

16 "A failure to alert prison authorities to this

17 intelligence would constitute a collusive act, since it

18 would amount to turning a blind eye to a situation of

19 real and imminent danger."

20 The family of Billy Wright endorse Judge Cory's

21 comments, but, having heard the evidence and

22 explanations for this failure to warn both the Minister

23 and NIPS, we would go further and say that it is proof

24 of a collusive act by the Security Services which

25 facilitated the death of Billy Wright.

49
 1 Did the Security Services pass this information to

2 the RUC? Dealing with the telephone call of

3 21 April 1997, the Service say this information was

4 passed orally to RUC E3A by AH on 21 April 1997 in

5 a documentary form by way of a NIIR sent to a number of

6 RUC addressees on 24 April 1997. We know from the

7 PSNI's solicitor's letter PS02-0036 sent on

8 13 November 2008 that the police say:

9 "There is no record of the receipt of this

10 information by the RUC", and the manner is described as

11 "by AH". The Service have no written attendance note

12 for file documenting the details of the telephone

13 conversation between AH and an RUC officer in E3A on

14 21 April 1997. This alleged oral communication rests

15 largely upon the testimony of AH, which must be examined

16 against evidence that was given by an RUC Detective

17 Inspector in E3A known as FG.

18 AH stated that on the day he received this

19 intelligence he had telephoned E3A. There is no written

20 record to say to whom he spoke, but when he gave

21 evidence on the second occasion, he said he was fairly

22 sure it was either FG or a second RUC officer known as

23 DS E3A North. DS E3A North is unavailable.

24 Looking at the evidence of Detective Inspector FG,

25 it is noted that he provided a witness statement. He

50
 1 stated that he did not recall receiving any telephone

2 call in respect of the information summarised at

3 SS01-0218, nor did he recall discussing this matter with

4 the agent handler.

5 However, when he gave came to give evidence, there

6 were several shifts in his recollection. He said he had

7 never seen this NIIR. He stated that he did not

8 remember AH, that it was not normal for agent handlers

9 to have direct contact with his desk. He then, however,

10 went on to say that he was not challenging the evidence

11 of AH about the conversations and he went further by

12 accepting that, having heard the evidence of AH, it

13 seems that conversations did take place.

14 Sorry, I will repeat that. It seems that that

15 conversation did take place.

16 He is also not prepared to dispute what was in AH's

17 telephone note about the conversation concerning the

18 hostage incident. He later accepts that AH was actually

19 correct and does not challenge the assertion by AH that

20 he, FG, was the principal point of contact rather than

21 his colleague.

22 Finally, he accepts that he recollects that there

23 would have been not much less than 50 contacts in a year

24 with AH and that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy

25 of what AH had recorded.

51
 1 In assessing FG and AH, it is equally unhelpful to

2 those seeking to ascertain the truth when the Inquiry

3 sought to recall FG to answer outstanding questions

4 about April 1997 when it was established he, too, had

5 left the country and was not available for further

6 interview. The police say they have no record of the

7 receipt of this information as described by AH in his

8 witness testimony.

9 As there are no detailed telephone attendance notes

10 in existence in either Security Service or RUC records,

11 is it likely that an agent handler from one organisation

12 would have direct contact with the Headquarters of other

13 organisation?

14 Let us look at what some RUC Special Branch

15 witnesses said about this. Chris Albiston,

16 ex-Special Branch Head, said:

17 "I find that surprising:

18 "Witness DG, ex-Head of Special Branch said:

19 "I am surprised."

20 Witness ZBH, ex-RUC Special Branch superintendent

21 and RUC Intelligence Management Group at Headquarters,

22 said:

23 "In all my time with IMG I have never spoken to

24 a Security Services agent handler."

25 Witness ZCQ an ex-RUC SB Inspector said:

52
 1 "I think this is a strange route. It was unusual

2 for a Security Services handler to telephone E3A."

3 Against that, however, a contrary view was expressed

4 by Witness ZBO, an ex-Detective Chief Inspector in the

5 Belfast RUC Source Unit who said:

6 "The Security Services would deal directly with HQ,

7 probably with their own representative there."

8 That distinction should be noted.

9 However, the weight of RUC evidence appeared to

10 point towards scepticism on the part of most senior RUC

11 officers who gave evidence as to the suggestion by AH

12 that he telephoned E3A with this intelligence on

13 21 April 1997.

14 Why would an agent handler expose his identity to

15 a wider pool of people and not channel this information

16 through his team leader or a desk officer? The Service

17 outlined a number of methods by which they could

18 transfer intelligence, particularly source reports, from

19 the Service to the RUC in April 1997. They included via

20 telegram, secure fax or a NIIR.

21 An example of information gathered by AH being

22 channelled to the RUC orally regarding an IRA threat to

23 Kevin McAlorum was discussed. There was a telephone

24 conversation between an RUC Inspector and Source Unit

25 and a Security Service official followed up by a text

53
 1 faxed to Witness DB. McAlorum, at that time, also was

2 in prison.

3 There was, it would appear, a tried and trusted

4 procedure. Why was there a departure from the norm?

5 Does all of this suggest there is substance to the

6 scepticism of senior RUC officers of AH's account?

7 The PSNI commissioned their own report. Assistant

8 Chief Constable Sam Kincaid, formerly of the RUC, made

9 enquiries into this intelligence, which he said would

10 indicate that the Security Service probably would have

11 phoned the relevant desk in E3 to discuss this type of

12 message in advance of any paper document. No memo

13 record of any telephone call has been recorded. This

14 finding does support the view that the route for such

15 intelligence would have been a phone call to E3 HQ and

16 offers corroboration for AH's evidence in that regard.

17 What is the conclusion to be? One cannot lose sight

18 of two significant matters.

19 First, on the two occasions he gave evidence, AH was

20 not challenged by the Police Service of Northern Ireland

21 as to the truthfulness of his account. It was never put

22 to him that he did not have any conversation with E3A on

23 21 April 1997 or that he did not pass on this

24 intelligence on that date. Indeed, on the second

25 occasion he attended before the Inquiry, no questions

54
 1 were put to him by the PSNI. Is not the silence

2 deafening?

3 Secondly, one has to have regard to the lack of

4 effective challenge by FG to AH's account.

5 Those evidential concessions by FG cannot be

6 overlooked and, accordingly, the evidence of AH, we say,

7 must be preferred. In such circumstances and where the

8 second RUC officer named by AH has not made himself

9 available to the Inquiry, then the family of Mr Wright

10 have come to the conclusion that the evidence of AH has

11 been tested on two occasions, remained consistent, is

12 supported by SS01-0240, and must be accepted by the

13 Inquiry.

14 We are of the opinion that this intelligence was

15 passed by phone to RUC E3A on 21 April 1997. This is

16 the first occasion that intelligence and threat to the

17 life of Billy Wright from the INLA, if he were to be

18 moved to H6, was passed to the RUC.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: That would be a point at which you could stop

20 I think.

21 MR KANE: Very well.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Fifteen minutes.

23 (11.17 pm)

24 (A short break)

25 (11.32 pm)

55
 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr Kane?

2 MR KANE: I have reached the point of the question of the

3 RUC addressees for the April 1997 NIIR and there were

4 eight, at least, RUC addressees, and they are set out at

5 page 156.

6 The question is: did these RUC officers receive this

7 NIIR?

8 Chris Albiston in his statement said he would have

9 expected that he would have received the NIIR

10 underpinning SS01-0218 and that he was probably

11 generally aware of this information. However, when he

12 came to give evidence, he qualified his statement,

13 saying he could no longer recall.

14 Witness ZCQ from E3 Republican desk denied any

15 receipt or any recollection of the NIIR being received

16 or being discussed.

17 Witness ZBT, Superintendent in E9, and he was the

18 Detective Superintendent in charge of E9, said:

19 "I should say that I am not denying that it passed

20 across my desk. I am not saying that I didn't see it.

21 I'm saying to you that I have no recollection of seeing

22 it whatsoever."

23 He then went on, however, to say it would not have

24 been his remit to take any action on it.

25 Witness ZBV, Superintendent in E9A, said that he had

56
 1 no recollection of seeing the NIIR at that time. He

2 later said that he believed that the person in the RUC

3 that should have dealt with the information was

4 superintendent in E9, Witness ZBE. Witness ZBE, who was

5 a superintendent in intelligence in E3 in 1997 is

6 regrettably out of the jurisdiction and the Inquiry has

7 been unable to hear from this vital witness. I have

8 already dealt with how, in more recent times, we have

9 learned of his illness. Any criticism which may have

10 been expressed in respect of his absence is retracted in

11 the event of the illness of the witness.

12 Witness ZBR, who was an E9D desk officer, said he

13 had no recollection of receiving the NIIR. Witness ZBQ

14 Regional Head of Belfast Special Branch gave evidence

15 and there was a prepared witness statement from him. He

16 said he was quite sure, if he had received the

17 intelligence referred to in the NIIR, he would have

18 remembered it. He denied receipt.

19 Looking at the NIIR delivery procedure, this was

20 a complicated and somewhat confusing exercise which the

21 Inquiry, through evidence, carried out. Efforts of

22 resolution of this conflict were not helped by the

23 differing memories of various police officers as to how

24 NIIRs were delivered to their offices. Former

25 ACC Kincaid indicated that he believed they were issued

57
 1 on a read-and-return basis and was in agreement with the

2 Security Services letter sent on 5 March 1997.

3 That letter does not assist beyond indicating the

4 general mechanism for the delivery of NIIRs and offers

5 no evidence that this particular NIIR was delivered and

6 received by these RUC officers.

7 Dealing then with what was known as an Intrep of

8 28 May 1997, the issue of the NIIR and whether or not it

9 was sent and received is complicated by the existence of

10 what is known as an Intrep found at PS01-0205 dated

11 28 May 1997. An Intrep is an intelligence report

12 document inputted into the RUC computer database

13 containing intelligence which is accessible to nominated

14 members of the RUC Special Branch.

15 In this instance, the SS01-0218 NIIR is marked "INLA

16 desire to murder Billy Wright". That title and the text

17 of that NIIR containing the threat intelligence about

18 Billy Wright has been transferred verbatim onto the RUC

19 computer system as Intrep PS01-0205. That intelligence

20 was placed on the computer system on 28 May 1997.

21 It would appear that the Inquiry obtained the

22 initial NIIR documentation from the Security Services

23 but, by mid-2007, the RUC, despite service of a notice

24 seeking such intelligence material, had failed to

25 disclose its existence or to furnish this intelligence,

58
 1 and perhaps more correctly, by 2007, it was the PSNI as

2 opposed to the RUC.

3 The PSNI were confronted about this and with the

4 fact that the Inquiry were aware that the Security

5 Services had provided to the RUC relating to this

6 threat, but that the PSNI had failed to properly respond

7 to the notice and provide it to the Inquiry. It was

8 only after this challenge that the document was handed

9 over by the PSNI to the Inquiry.

10 The initial non-compliance with the notice,

11 therefore, must cast doubt on the credibility of the

12 police as a corporate body in terms of the probity of

13 their engagement with this Inquiry. It raises

14 suspicions that there may be other undisclosed

15 information within their possession and that the police

16 have sought to obstruct the work of this Inquiry.

17 The DCI staff rep, as noted, has no record that the

18 NIIR was delivered to the RUC addressees, although he

19 has indicated he is very confident that it was

20 distributed. It was also confirmed by DCI staff rep

21 that there was no system to record a NIIR's delivery.

22 It was accepted that NIIRs were received by the

23 DCI Rep office and not by a secure fax from the

24 Assessments Group. There is no document capable of

25 substantiating per se whether these named RUC officers

59
 1 ever received the NIIR.

2 The evidence of DBA revealed the process by which

3 this particular NIIR ended up as an Intrep on the RUC

4 computer system. It would appear, again after much

5 exploration, that they eventually found out what did

6 take place. It would appear that DCI Staff Rep's office

7 bundled up a collection of NIIR documents in hard copy

8 form and then walked them round to SB Registry where RUC

9 staff would transfer these hard copy NIIRs onto a floppy

10 disk, before the disk containing the NIIR intelligence

11 was then inputted on the CAISTER computer system by DBA

12 as an Intrep.

13 Some controversy arose during the Inquiry as to

14 whether the original NIIR with a grading of B2, meaning

15 "regular and reliable", was changed by the RUC to an E5

16 Intrep grading of "unsafe and unsatisfactory".

17 To say this grading had the potential to cause

18 confusion would be understating matters, but ultimately

19 the Intrep grading was of no significance. It would

20 appear that the police have attempted to downplay the

21 significance of this intelligence being on their

22 computer system.

23 Is it being suggested by the police that by sending

24 information to a data inputter in late May 1997, the

25 Security Service has buried the information with

60
 1 thousands of other pieces?

2 If this is the inference to be drawn from the police

3 evidence, it can be quickly dismissed, as no such case

4 has been put forward by any police witness, nor has the

5 Service been challenged in such terms.

6 Furthermore, the hard copy NIIR was delivered to the

7 Special Branch Registry. There is no question that this

8 NIIR was entered onto the RUC computer system by RUC

9 officers, and DBA also revealed during the course of his

10 evidence at page 25 that between 28 May 1997 and the

11 murder on 27 December 1997 it was possible for RUC

12 Special Branch officers to have viewed the text of that

13 NIIR.

14 This is damning of the RUC and confirms that for

15 a period of seven months between 28 May and

16 27 December 1997 intelligence was on their system

17 showing that the INLA intended to murder Billy Wright if

18 he were moved to H6.

19 It is beyond peradventure that that intelligence was

20 not properly identified, analysed and acted on by the

21 RUC in 1997. It would appear that it had not been

22 picked up by any Special Branch officers at that time,

23 or, if it was, they have failed to act on that

24 information. Was such a failure to act deliberately

25 closing of the eyes? If so, it would be collusion of

61
 1 the greatest kind and it certainly would have

2 facilitated the murder of Billy Wright.

3 On the NIIR distribution issue it would be submitted

4 that neither side has demonstrated satisfactory

5 corporate performance through the absence or retention

6 of proper records. One cannot ignore the fact that the

7 NIIR must have been sent to the RUC, and the report of

8 Mr Kincaid confirms that it is not disputed by police

9 that the NIIR was received by them. It is, of course,

10 the position that they cannot say anything else, as the

11 intelligence contained within the NIIR appears in the

12 RUC intelligence system as the Intrep.

13 Accordingly, for the reasons outlined and as appear

14 more fully on page 163 of our written submission, the

15 Wright family have concluded that the RUC did receive

16 the NIIR from the Security Services and it was sent to

17 the addressees mentioned. What action should the RUC

18 have taken, therefore, in respect of the intelligence

19 contained in the NIIR? The RUC Force Order 60/91

20 imposed a general mandatory duty on police officers to

21 notify individuals of a threat to their life if

22 intelligence of that nature came to police attention.

23 Mr Albiston said that source sensitivities would not

24 be sufficient to prevent a threat being actioned. As he

25 pointed out, the force order was mandatory and needed to

62
 1 be complied with unless there was a compelling reason

2 for not doing so. He was asked:

3 "Question: Could it have been thought that because

4 of newspaper reports the matter was in the public domain

5 anyway?"

6 He answered:

7 "I think our view would be that intelligence is

8 intelligence and newspaper discussion is something

9 different."

10 The witness stated the only excuse for not following

11 the source order is that the intelligence had been

12 regarded as unreliable, but it must be remembered that

13 the intelligence was graded by the Security Service as

14 B2. It is also worth noting that at no stage of the

15 Inquiry has any police witness for the PSNI said the

16 intelligence was unreliable. The witness confirmed

17 action could have been taken which would camouflage the

18 source. Counsel for the Inquiry pursued this line of

19 questioning as to whether the intelligence was

20 disregarded by the RUC. He answered:

21 "Answer: No, no. All intelligence about threats is

22 very carefully assessed, and, in the terms of the

23 Force Order, unless there is a good reason to believe

24 that the intelligence of is no value, then there are

25 certain procedures which have to be taken, but the

63
 1 intelligence has to be assessed."

2 It should be noted that there is no record at all to

3 show that the RUC discarded this intelligence and that

4 case was never made by the PSNI or any police witness.

5 Mr Kincaid said:

6 "It should have led to two things, a discussion with

7 senior people in the Northern Ireland Office about the

8 issue of the safety of Billy Wright in the prison and

9 some sort of information being passed to obviously the

10 Prison Governor specific to it.

11 "The third issue, I say, possibly, too, would have

12 been the consideration of giving the district commander

13 a heads-up in relation to that as well. My view on this

14 particular document was: on something serious like this,

15 when you take a prisoner's right to freedom off him,

16 then it has obviously raised issues in terms of the

17 extent to which he would brief those people who take

18 over the responsibility of providing for their security

19 and protection. That's why I say it is not just the

20 district commander even going to the Governor. It would

21 be to the prison authorities as well."

22 Mr Kincaid did refer to general situations where

23 threat messages have not been passed on, but added:

24 "There were really good reasons for that and

25 well-documented. In this particular case I have found

64
 1 nothing of that sort in terms of the reliability of the

2 intelligence."

3 There are no records in either police or Security

4 Service files to show that these good countervailing

5 reasons applied. In fact, this intelligence was graded

6 "regular and reliable" and there is no documentary

7 evidence to show that a decision was made not to pass on

8 the intelligence for good reason.

9 The most significant support for the proposition

10 that the intelligence should have been actioned by the

11 RUC does, in fact, come from the former Chief Constable

12 himself, Sir Ronnie Flanagan. It was remarkable that

13 the former Chief Constable, who was in post at the time

14 of the murder, did not become aware, until he appeared

15 at the Inquiry, that intelligence existed in the police

16 system eight months before Billy Wright's death that he

17 was to be murdered by INLA at H6. He was asked about

18 SS01-0218. The question was:

19 "Question: You have said you would have expected

20 action to be taken if this information was received.

21 "Answer: I've said that several times."

22 Therefore, any suggestion that the RUC had a valid

23 reason for not distributing this intelligence as per the

24 Force Order does not stand up to scrutiny and it is

25 apparent from the comments of the former Chief Constable

65
 1 and two Assistant Chief Constables that this threat

2 intelligence should have been disseminated and a warning

3 issued.

4 Dealing then with what is determined in our written

5 submission as the intelligence failure theory, the

6 question can be asked: why was this April NIIR

7 containing threat intelligence, which appears to have

8 been sent to so many addressees in the RUC, not actioned

9 by them?

10 The first reason suggests it was the sheer volume of

11 intelligence and then Witness ZBH, who worked in E3

12 Republican desk, stated:

13 "I would estimate that about 99% of the information

14 it contained was RUC intelligence. On many occasions,

15 I would not have read a NIIR in detail if I recognised

16 the information."

17 It should be noted there that he is not saying he

18 would not have read the NIIR, but he refers to the

19 detail and the qualification as to whether or not he

20 recognised the information.

21 Witness ZCR, talking about the training system --

22 and he was known as an analyst on the E3 desk -- said:

23 "I had never been involved in desk work before going

24 to the E3A desk. In my post in the E3A desk I was known

25 as an analyst, though I had no training as such. You

66
 1 learned your job by what others were doing. I cannot

2 remember what guidance we got with the issues on the

3 desk."

4 We have to say this is an unimpressive admission,

5 touching upon how a State agency charged with the

6 protection of the lives of citizens in Northern Ireland

7 discharged its functions.

8 So was it the case that there was an intelligence

9 failure by the RUC on this occasion? Some RUC officers

10 have expressed scepticism at this suggestion, notably

11 Witness ZBH, who said:

12 "I would be surprised if this information regarding

13 the threat to Billy Wright in April 1997 had been passed

14 and slipped through the entire system."

15 The witness also points the finger at the Security

16 Services, highlighting that the Assessments Group,

17 headed by HAG, compiled a monthly paper called the

18 monthly intelligence review, and the witness would have

19 expected that intelligence to appear in the briefing

20 papers prepared for this review at some stage.

21 HAG, in his second appearance before the Inquiry,

22 disputed ZBH's claim, saying that the review was not

23 going through individual pieces of intelligence.

24 However, when one examines the unredacted part of that

25 document at paragraph 8, reference is made as follows in

67
 1 the MIAR:

2 "On 28 April 1997, two members of INLA in

3 HMP Maghaberry took a prison officer hostage, reportedly

4 in protest against Billy Wright's transfer to an INLA

5 block in the Maze."

6 Remarkably, we say, yet inexplicably, there is no

7 reference in this passage to the information in the

8 possession of the Security Services that the INLA were

9 planning to kill Billy Wright at this H Block. The

10 Wright family consider it extremely bewildering and

11 believe that this information should have been included

12 in the MIAR but that does not exculpate the RUC.

13 In this case, there was not an intelligence failure,

14 as the information was passed to the RUC, but there was

15 a failure to act on the intelligence received.

16 Dealing then with the unreliable intelligence

17 theory, an alternative theory was pursued by Mr Stewart.

18 This line of questioning we say is speculative

19 conjecture and suffers from an absence of supporting

20 evidence, thereby diminishing any weight capable of

21 being afforded to it.

22 It must be noted that any view that the information

23 could be disregarded as unreliable was not advanced in

24 any of the witness statements supplied by Intelligence

25 Service witnesses to the Inquiry, and even the RUC did

68
 1 not make any such claim.

2 It was pointed out to agent handler by Mr Stewart

3 that the NIIR was not issued until three days later on

4 24 April 1997, but the agent handler correctly and

5 indeed sharply responded that the intelligence was

6 disseminated immediately to the RUC on 21 April 1997,

7 the same day he received it.

8 Definitively, we say agent handler was then

9 expressly asked the following question:

10 "Question: Did you at any time take the decision

11 either by yourself or in conjunction with anyone else

12 that the information you passed on should be

13 disregarded?

14 "Answer: No.

15 "Question: Have you seen any documentation of any

16 kind recording of such a decision to disregard this

17 information?

18 "Answer: No."

19 This short exchange, which is commended to the

20 Inquiry, confirms there is no documentary evidence to

21 support the propositions advanced, and the Inquiry has

22 heard from the witness that the evidential maelstrom --

23 that the Security Service witness himself did not pass

24 on this information with the intention it should be

25 disregarded or come to any such understanding with the

69
 1 RUC.

2 No explanation has been forthcoming from any RUC

3 witnesses as to why the organisation failed to act on

4 that intelligence in its possession and no documentary

5 records produced which would explain that inactivity.

6 The RUC have offered no excuse for this failure to act.

7 An adverse inference should be drawn against them in

8 this regard. Failure to act on this intelligence would

9 clearly fall within the range of defined collusive

10 conduct. It most certainly is facilitating behaviour

11 and should be determined as such.

12 Dealing then with the question of the position of

13 the Northern Ireland Prison Service and the intelligence

14 contained in the April NIIR, the question is, therefore,

15 why the NIIR was not sent to the Northern Ireland

16 Prison Service. The key evidence is that of DO2, the

17 desk officer Assessments Group. That witness said:

18 "Responding to threats and acting upon them was the

19 RUC's responsibility. However, this should be

20 contrasted with the NIIR dated 19 July 1996 headed "UVF

21 leadership: authorised execution of Billy Wright", where

22 it was noted that:

23 "This information has already been passed to the RUC

24 and action taken. Wright is aware of the threat."

25 This demonstrates that there was a feedback

70
 1 mechanism by which RUC comments on the NIIR were

2 provided and recorded. Bishop Oliver pursued this point

3 with DO2 as to why the NIIR was not passed on to the

4 prison, and DO2 stated:

5 "Answer: It is highly likely that I would have

6 asked the agent handler whether that information could

7 go directly to the prison as well to the police. For

8 source sensitivity reasons, he would have said no.

9 There is no documentary evidence to support this claim

10 and, indeed, this seems to be an answer plucked out of

11 thin air by this witness."

12 It was contradicted by AH himself, when he gave

13 evidence. He asserted that the intelligence was not fit

14 for dissemination without discussion and that no

15 discussion took place, nor was there any record of such

16 a discussion taking place.

17 Accordingly, the evidence of DO2 as to why the NIIR

18 was not sent to the prison must be dismissed as

19 unreliable. When DO2 reattended, she did, while

20 asserting the Security Service line that the threat was

21 tactical, not strategic, accept that the murder of

22 Wright would have had strategic implications.

23 DO3 in evidence indicated that, although it was

24 possible to send information to the Prison Service, this

25 would be the exception rather than the rule. DO3

71
 1 confirmed that SS01-0222 was a NIIR where the Prison

2 Information Unit of NIPS was an addressee who had been

3 highlighted from a full customer list.

4 It is incredible, therefore, to think that

5 a standardised NIIR distribution list existed upon which

6 the Prison Service are marked, and presumably the

7 Minister, yet inexplicably, Security Service officials

8 from DO2, DO3 through to HAG do not take a highlighter

9 pen out of their pocket and mark the Prison Service and

10 the Prisons Minister as addressees for a report about

11 a threat to murder Billy Wright in the Maze Prison.

12 When one sees how other NIIRs containing information

13 such as threats from the UVF to attack prison officers

14 were sent to the Minister and the Prison Service, there

15 can be no excuse for this failure to pass this

16 intelligence to the Prison Service.

17 This takes on a more sinister connotation when one

18 considers the misleading accounts Security Service

19 officers have attempted to provide to the Inquiry.

20 The family assert that collusion can be found to

21 exist on the part of the Security Services by the

22 deliberate withholding of information from both the

23 Northern Ireland Prison Service and the Prisons Minister

24 regarding the INLA threat to murder Billy Wright in

25 H Block 6. The defences offered by the Security Service

72
 1 in respect of this submission are entirely unconvincing.

2 In her statement, DO3 was unable to say whether this

3 NIIR went to the Security Minister because she did not

4 remember its content. On the other hand, at page 3,

5 paragraph 10, she said that most report NIIRs were sent

6 to the Security Minister and this was regarded as

7 a report NIIR.

8 It must be borne in mind that this all occurred at

9 a time when the Security Minister was in correspondence

10 with his officials and HAG has been copied into that

11 correspondence regarding his dilemma as to where to

12 place Billy Wright.

13 Furthermore, it should be noted that members of the

14 Security Services Assessment Group attended Prison

15 Liaison Group meetings and this was another route

16 whereby this information could have reached the

17 Prison Service. The same also applies to RUC

18 Special Branch representatives who attended the Prison

19 Liaison Group.

20 The Wright family hold the view that the more

21 opportunities that were missed to pass this information

22 to the Prisons Minister and the Northern Ireland

23 Prison Service, the more there is an appearance of

24 an intentional failure to inform NIPS, rather than

25 a breakdown in communication. Why did no-one in

73
 1 Assessments Group say this information must go to the

2 Prison Service and to the Prisons Minister?

3 When DCI Rep Knock came to give evidence on Day 99,

4 he had previously provided a witness statement in which

5 he laboured the point that the NIIR had no policy

6 implications and therefore the Security Services were

7 justified in not sending it to anyone other than the

8 RUC.

9 Sir John Wheeler himself has said he would have

10 expected to be informed about the matters in the NIIR.

11 It is notable that, when challenged, DCI Rep Knock said:

12 "I am not saying there were no policy implications

13 from this particular reporting. I am saying it was

14 primarily to do with threat reporting."

15 Crucially, when DCI1 was asked if he could envisage

16 a situation where information of this nature, that is

17 the INLA threat, would not be disseminated by way of

18 NIIR to the Chief Executive of the Prison Service, his

19 reply was unambiguous:

20 "No, absolutely not."

21 He emphasised that even if there were source

22 sensitivities, some way had to be found to get the

23 information to him. The bottom line is that the

24 Northern Ireland Prison Service did not receive this

25 intelligence from the Security Services or the RUC.

74
 1 Either party was equally well-placed to provide this

2 intelligence and there was a duty upon both parties to

3 ensure that this was done.

4 The Wright family are left with a situation where

5 not just one agency, but two intelligence agencies have

6 failed to pass on threat intelligence to the

7 Northern Ireland Prison Service, and ultimately to

8 Billy Wright, that there was a plot to murder him inside

9 the Maze Prison. Failure on the part of MI5 and RUC

10 Special Branch to ensure that this intelligence was

11 properly disseminated cost Mr Wright his life.

12 The intelligence in document SS01-0218 was put to

13 Seamus McNeill, the Assistant Director, in one of the

14 most memorable moments of the Inquiry, when he

15 dramatically said:

16 "We were in regular contact with Special Branch.

17 Literally for once, Mr Batchelor, I am speechless."

18 At that time I think the document became known as

19 "the shock doc".

20 Finally, Sir John Wheeler declared:

21 "If that information had come to me as a Minister,

22 I would have asked the chief executive of NIPS 'What are

23 you going to do about this?".

24 It is clear from the above answers that the

25 intelligence would have had a significant impact upon

75
 1 the Northern Ireland Prison Service as to where

2 Mr Wright was to be located, how he was to be protected,

3 what prison regime was to be put in place in the block

4 he would inhabit to frustrate the killers and would

5 generally have heightened the Northern Ireland

6 Prison Service's guard level.

7 Had NIPS been made aware of the greater danger from

8 INLA and the active plan to kill Mr Wright, then, as

9 Mr McNeill pointed out, they would have been into

10 a whole new ball game which could have led to Mr Wright

11 being kept at Maghaberry, being placed on another

12 H Block, or stricter security measures such as proper

13 and frequent searching and removing 24-hour unlock from

14 H6.

15 However, none of these safeguards were actively

16 considered by the Minister or the Prison Service and H6

17 with its lax regime ended up as the preferred option,

18 because the Minister and the Security Services kept this

19 information from the Prison Service and the Minister.

20 It was their responsibility to properly brief the

21 Minister and the Prison Service. They did not do so.

22 As a result of being kept in the dark, the NIO

23 officials unwittingly sent him to his death in H6. For

24 that withholding of information, the Security Services

25 and RUC are guilty of collusion and facilitating the

76
 1 death of Billy Wright.

2 A summary of the points just made can be found at

3 page 185, lines 21 through to page 186, line 11 in

4 respect of matters pertaining to Security Services'

5 collusion.

6 Dealing with RUC collusion, in the complete void of

7 an explanation and in the circumstances of the case, the

8 family would submit the police's actions must be

9 regarded in a more sinister light when one considers the

10 number of failings by them. Those include: the

11 intelligence was not passed on to NIPS; the intelligence

12 was not passed by Special Branch to the RUC commander in

13 Lisburn for his attention and action; the police

14 message 1 warning was not given to Billy Wright; the

15 intelligence was not passed on to NIPS during any of the

16 five PLG meetings. RUC Special Branch subsequently

17 attended with senior police officials.

18 All of this breached the RUC's own Force Order 60/91

19 in the handling of threat intelligence.

20 There was a history, however, of failing to alert

21 Billy Wright of threats to his life. In October 1996,

22 Billy Wright was not informed of the threat to his life

23 which arose from intelligence passed by the army to the

24 RUC that the INLA intended to murder him and the

25 Reverend William McCrea.

77
 1 The second occasion was in April 1997 under present

2 consideration. The third occasion was in June 1997 when

3 the Garda lost information relating to Billy Wright, and

4 while others appear to have been informed, there is no

5 evidence that this information was passed to

6 Billy Wright or to the prison in June 1997.

7 Therefore, on three separate occasions in

8 an eighth-month period, the RUC did not pass

9 intelligence in their possession of a threat to

10 Billy Wright on to him or to those charged with his safe

11 custody. To paraphrase Oscar Wilde: to fail to pass on

12 one threat is unfortunate; to fail to pass on two is

13 careless; to fail to pass on three, well, we invite the

14 Panel to make their appropriate literary determination.

15 From at least 21 April 1997, Security Services knew

16 the INLA intended to murder Billy Wright. From either

17 the same date or, at the latest, 28 May 1997, the RUC

18 knew he was to be murdered in H6. There was a failure

19 to warn the Minister. There was a failure to warn the

20 Northern Ireland Prison Service. There was a failure to

21 warn Billy Wright. The consequences of those failures

22 were the gunmen were able to carry out this murder.

23 As a result, a wave of violence was unleashed that

24 led to the deaths of ten people. It may be said that

25 the State bears a moral responsibility for those deaths,

78
 1 including that of Billy Wright. The State agencies were

2 possessed of pre-emptive intelligence that could have

3 prevented the Billy Wright murder if they had acted

4 properly. By deliberately failing to carry out their

5 duties and not warning those who needed to be warned of

6 this murder plot, State intelligence agencies let the

7 murder happen and therefore by any definition are guilty

8 of collusion and facilitating the murder of

9 Billy Wright.

10 If I could then deal briefly with the issue of

11 post-murder intelligence that's found in SS01-0358,

12 which was January 1998 intelligence. According to the

13 summary agreed by the Billy Wright Inquiry with the

14 Security Service and the MoD, these documents were

15 obtained in December 1997. The inclusion of the receipt

16 of documents in December 1997 is of interest and also

17 documents received in January 1998. AH said this

18 information was not obtained by the Security Services

19 until after the murder some time in January 1998. In

20 part 1 of SS01-0358 it says that:

21 "During the evening of 15 December 1997 seven

22 members of INLA, named five named members and two

23 others, met at Belfast address 2."

24 The use of the phrase "two others" does not signify

25 that their identity was unknown. The Wright family do

79
 1 not know whether there is any significance as to the

2 reason why these various two INLA members are not more

3 fully described.

4 In January 1998 information was received to the

5 effect that in the middle of December 1997 a meeting had

6 been held at which the INLA Chief of Staff was present,

7 when an INLA executive decision had been taken by

8 an Ard Chomhairle to murder Billy Wright using the gun

9 that was probably in prison by that time.

10 In dealing with this there are many limitations

11 placed upon ourselves. It must be highlighted

12 immediately that the family are at a distinct

13 disadvantage in their views on these documents, as they

14 are summaries of intelligence information. There are

15 many unanswered questions surrounding these documents

16 that they have not been able to put in the absence of

17 the original material. Therefore, the submissions made

18 on this aspect of the Billy Wright Inquiry are

19 necessarily limited. The family's concerns about this

20 intelligence has continued as a result of these

21 restrictions, and they believe there has been a lack of

22 transparency in this important area.

23 The first point to be made in this instance is that

24 the Security Services and PSNI are at loggerheads as to

25 whether the Security Services ever passed this

80
 1 information on to the RUC.

2 Secondly, is it possible that this information was

3 obtained by the Service prior to the murder?

4 Thirdly, did the agent or agents know of the murder

5 plot in advance and fail to inform their handlers?

6 If we look at the PSNI reply to the position paper,

7 we find that this document was posted on the police

8 website from May 2008. The police state:

9 "Suggestions that it was at a meeting in Belfast in

10 mid-December where the executive of INLA decided to

11 murder Wright are not based on intelligence owned or

12 possessed by the RUC at the time."

13 That appears to be stating that the police did not

14 believe it was that meeting where the decision on the

15 murder took place. Indeed, the Inquiry heard

16 subsequently from former ACC Kincaid that the people who

17 were at the meeting noted in paragraph 1 were, with one

18 exception, foot solders while the people mentioned in

19 paragraph 2 were the top brass.

20 Mr Kincaid confirmed that there was a second meeting

21 on 15 December 1997 involving the top brass and it was

22 this meeting that he believed was covered by paragraphs

23 2 to 5 of SS01-0358.

24 At the bottom of the police's reply on page 70 of

25 the position paper it is stated:

81
 1 "The PSNI have been made aware that document

2 SS01-0358 was passed to the RUC in January 1998 by

3 another agency."

4 While this is oblique, it is almost undoubtedly

5 referring, we say, to the Security Services, the other

6 State agency.

7 Page 52 of the police reply said:

8 "Put simply, neither the RUC then, or the PSNI now,

9 hold any original intelligence as to whether this

10 meeting discussed or planned the murder of Billy Wright.

11 It is not for the PSNI to comment on the knowledge or

12 circumstances of obtaining such knowledge held by others

13 of this meeting."

14 The "others" in our view can only be the Security

15 Services. However, cryptic comments can only deepen the

16 mystery and add to the family's anxiety, and should, we

17 request, be explained by the Inquiry in its report

18 insofar as is possible.

19 This issue has not been properly clarified by the

20 police, and it is critical to the Inquiry, the public

21 and the Wright family that the police now state fully

22 the matters that they felt it inappropriate to comment

23 on at page 52 of their response. The police and

24 Security Services dispute whether this information was

25 ever passed to the RUC.

82
 1 Unlike SS01-0218, there is no manuscript note

2 written by anyone in the Assessments Group to say that

3 the NIIR has been passed to the police. Security

4 Services, however, late in the day, did produce a full

5 cover sheet of the NIIR to show the addressees on that

6 document.

7 The January NIIR was disclosed by the Security

8 Services and has a date of issue of 15 January 1998.

9 Included in the NIIR were a number of addressees ranging

10 from the Northern Ireland Office, the RUC, the

11 Security Services, army HQ, and the Northern Ireland

12 Office in London as well as the Cabinet Office. Quite

13 an array.

14 As will be recalled, the RUC maintained, in their

15 reply to a position paper, that they did not receive

16 this document. Security Services have said another

17 document which was communicated to the RUC by secure fax

18 was drawn upon for the purposes of the summary document

19 SS01-0358. This intelligence contained exactly the same

20 intelligence as the NIIR.

21 They said that the method of transmission by secure

22 fax would not have been receipted. It is notable that

23 in this instance the Security Service were able to

24 produce their log book, which showed the distribution of

25 the NIIRs in London, whereas they have been unable to

83
 1 produce to the Inquiry the log book showing the alleged

2 distribution of NIIRs in Belfast in respect of the two

3 NIIRs being actively considered by this Inquiry.

4 For an organisation as large as the Security

5 Services to suggest that they had storage problems

6 beggars belief and the family do not find this

7 explanation particularly credible. However, as stated,

8 the police have accused the Security Services of

9 withholding this intelligence from them.

10 ACC Finlay was very firm and explicit in asserting

11 that he was not aware of the RUC being in possession of

12 any intelligence that came from another agency in

13 relation to this matter. This meant that agencies meant

14 to report via the RUC their intelligence gleaned were

15 not going through the proper direct routes, and that, if

16 there was information, it does not appear to have been

17 passed to the police, a serious charge from

18 a significant source.

19 It is up to the Panel to place whatever weight, if

20 any, that can significantly attach to the evidence of

21 the Detective Inspector ZBH in charge of E3A in

22 January 1998, who conceded that he probably saw the

23 information, or the gist of the information, in

24 January 1998 or in the months immediately following, and

25 then proceeded to say that he couldn't remember exactly

84
 1 and that he had made an assumption because it was the

2 norm that Security Services' intelligence would probably

3 be passed to Special Branch.

4 Former ACC Kincaid agreed that the information in

5 paragraph 1 of SS01-0358 was found in the police system.

6 With respect to paragraph 2, he indicated clearly that

7 he couldn't find a NIIR being circulated. He had not

8 found an Intrep, nor was there any report of an oral

9 phone call coming in to anyone.

10 He went on to make the very telling point:

11 "In the sense that, from the police perspective, to

12 be brutal about it, if there was one of these who didn't

13 want as an Intrep bluntly" -- I think that should read:

14 "If there was one of these we didn't want as an

15 Intrep, bluntly it would be the first one because it was

16 in the police system. That is a threat to Mr Wright.

17 This is the one after the event which is not in the

18 system.

19 "So he found the first one and I think from the

20 police perspective that's a hands-up on that one. On

21 the second one, we can't find -- we can't find a NIIR."

22 Finally, Witness DBA, a computer data administrator

23 with the RUC gave categorical evidence that on

24 a periodic basis DCI Rep staff would bring NIIRs to the

25 RUC Registry and they would be scanned in the Registry.

85
 1 His searches did not reveal any Intrep that can be

2 connected to the NIIR of January 1998.

3 It must, therefore, be concluded that the weight of

4 the evidence points toward the Security Services not

5 having passed this intelligence to the RUC. The

6 Security Services should be the subject of criticism for

7 failing to pass intelligence to the RUC in the period

8 shortly after the murder.

9 It may be said that this solely relates to

10 intelligence post-murder, but it also touches upon

11 whether, having withheld intelligence from the RUC, did

12 the Security Services also withhold material from the

13 Inquiry, or, indeed, was the intelligence in SS01-0358

14 available to the Security Services army prior to the

15 murder.

16 This ties in with another Security Service document,

17 namely the NIIR at SS01-0344, titled "INLA: where do

18 they go from here?" and more particularly paragraph 10

19 at page SS01-0347.

20 In that document it is stated as follows:

21 "At the INLA leadership meeting at which the murder

22 of Billy Wright was approved, no consideration was given

23 to the likely repercussions in relation to the IRSP's

24 political aspirations."

25 To this date, it remains unclear where this

86
 1 intelligence about what happened at the critical INLA

2 leadership meeting originated, but the phraseology

3 suggests that the Security Services or the RUC had

4 either a source or sources who reported on that meeting

5 or were present at it.

6 This then leads on to the next portion of

7 submissions concerning the testimonies provided by

8 ACC Finlay of the PSNI and Messrs Graham, Taylor and

9 Vincent McFadden of the Stevens Enquiry on Days 128 and

10 129. An order prevents public discussion of our written

11 submissions on this issue which were sent to the Inquiry

12 and are contained on pages 201-214. This is even though

13 the evidence from those days was heard by the public and

14 appeared on the Inquiry website. I will read our

15 conclusion in its redacted form which appears at

16 page 213.

17 The Wright family believe this chapter of evidence

18 raises the spectre of collusion between the State

19 [redaction] in the run-up to the killing that

20 [redaction] were involved in the conspiracy that State

21 agencies were in a position to know, ought to have known

22 or did, in fact, know of the plot to murder Billy Wright

23 prior to it taking place."

24 If I could then deal with ex-Maghaberry Prisoner 5

25 and the issue of firearms. In the Inquiry's position

87
 1 paper on the PSNI issued in January 2008, in

2 paragraph 260 it referred to the fact that in

3 John Glennon's prison file it had recovered a prison

4 intelligence document with a handwritten entry to the

5 effect that a gun had previously been smuggled into the

6 prison for Christopher McWilliams by an ex-Maghaberry

7 prisoner.

8 The only instances in which firearms were smuggled

9 into Northern Ireland prisons were the Maghaberry

10 hostage incident and the murder of Billy Wright. That

11 ex-prisoner was, at the time of the hostage incident and

12 the murder of Billy Wright,

13 .

14 There has been a restriction placed upon the public

15 evidence in this matter. The controversial role

16 remains shrouded in secrecy and adds to

17 the family's concerns. This was never questioned

18 or provided intelligence relating to smuggling weapons

19 into the prison, and what was the true purpose of the

20 Maghaberry hostage incident?

21 While there was intelligence on this individual from

22 1984-1998, there was nothing for the whole of 1997. Is

23 it the case that concealed his involvement in

24 the crime and did not disclose to the RUC the true

25 intentions of the INLA perpetrators to murder

88
 1 Billy Wright and thus prevent the steps being taken to

2 ensure that their murderous plans could not be put into

3 effect at a different prison, or is it the case that

4 did tell the RUC about the murder plot and, once

5 more, they did not act on intelligence that could have

6 prevented the murder?

7 The agencies' involvement in the hostage report was

8 dealt with as part of the Kincaid review, which has

9 remained secret. Therefore, the suspicion will linger

10 and fester that was involved in the plot to

11 murder Billy Wright but this information has been

12 withheld from the Wright family and the public.

13 In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, the

14 Wright family is firmly of the view that the secret

15 portion of the report is confirmation that there was

16 collusion between and the INLA in the plan

17 to murder Billy Wright. However, in the absence of

18 documentation, the family cannot put the matter at any

19 higher evidential level.

20 Was ex-Maghaberry prisoner , it might

21 well be asked. The Inquiry's position paper has at

22 paragraph 2.63 provided this expert from the

23 Kincaid Report:

24 "No new papers were discovered indicating the

25 involvement of a now deceased in the

89
 1 hostage incident."

2 In the police's response to the position paper, this

3 matter was dealt with under the heading "Firearm in

4 Maghaberry". Page 34 in the police response stated:

5 "At paragraphs 260-264 the Inquiry makes a number of

6 comments about the presence of a firearm in Maghaberry

7 and the suggestion that an was concerned in

8 the smuggling of this weapon into the prison. It is

9 accepted that the hostage incident, with the benefit of

10 hindsight, was a precursor to the murder of

11 Billy Wright. The presence of the firearm in that

12 incident is, therefore, an important incident for the

13 Inquiry to consider, but quite properly it has asked

14 questions of the PSNI's knowledge of this event."

15 The issue to be addressed is not whether the now

16 deceased ex-prisoner was , but whether he was

17 involved in the murder plot and whether he told

18 the true purpose of the gunmen or withheld that

19 information , and, ,

20 actively took part in the conspiracy to kill

21 Billy Wright.

22 The latter comments attributed to the Kincaid Report

23 may be an implicit acknowledgment that he was involved

24 in criminal conduct along with McWilliams in prison in

25 April 1997.

90
 1 It is an appalling situation when an is

2 suspected of involvement in smuggling weapons to gunmen.

3 A Section 19 order was made by the Inquiry stating that

4 RUC agent handlers would give evidence in camera.

5 The family has always been opposed in principle to

6 evidence being given in camera. They believe such

7 an approach defeats the purpose of the public Inquiry

8 and will not allay public concerns, which is the reason

9 why the Inquiry into Billy Wright's murder was set up in

10 the first place.

11 Nevertheless, having regard to the conflicts and

12 sensitivities involved, and in a spirit of cooperation,

13 the family submitted 90 questions to be asked of six RUC

14 agent handlers. The six handlers gave evidence and the

15 family do not know how many of the questions were asked

16 of the handlers.

17 Five questions were furnished to the Inquiry

18 concerning the possibility of criminality on the part of

19 the prisoner, his suspected role in weapon

20 smuggling and any RUC investigation of his behaviour.

21 Direct answers have not been provided as part of the

22 outcome of the closed session evidence. The family and

23 the public, therefore, still remain in the dark over the

24 involvement of in the INLA hostage incident.

25 The Inquiry have to date not resolved this serious

91
 1 allegation in a public manner that will address the

2 concerns of the Wright family and the general public of

3 the reported involvement of in a criminal

4 conspiracy.

5 In conclusion, it is with concern that the Wright

6 family noted the comments of Lord Stevens, who confirmed

7 that the possibility of agents withholding information

8 from handlers on a systematic basis depended on the

9 individual agents, while he confirmed coming across

10 situations where agents reported intelligence but their

11 handlers failed to do anything with it and pass the

12 information on further.

13 It is, if possible, and we invite the Inquiry to

14 state in its report, the answers to the applicable

15 questions posed.

16 If I can then deal with the MoD response to the

17 Inquiry, the Wright family do not believe that the MoD

18 have fully cooperated with the Billy Wright Inquiry and

19 provided all relevant materials to it. The interest was

20 heightened by army intelligence document MD01-0008

21 issued in January 1998. That document included

22 a comment that:

23 "The INLA members involved were

24 Christopher McWilliams, John Glennon and John Kenneway.

25 McWilliams and Kenneway had made a previous attempt on

92
 1 Wright's life in April 1997 in HMP Maghaberry.

2 "At last an INLA operation has been carried out

3 successfully, probably with the assistance of PIRA.

4 "This incident had been reported at the time and

5 became accepted wisdom as an attempt on the life of INLA

6 inmate Kevin McAlorum, but it was now apparent, in

7 January 1998, army intelligence said it was, in fact,

8 an attempt on Billy Wright's life.

9 All of this was explored with a number of army

10 witnesses. Witness AD was regional military

11 intelligence officer for 39 Brigade in Belfast in 1997

12 and he said that:

13 "I would imagine the collator would have drawn on

14 something in CAISTER, the army intelligence computer

15 database."

16 His later attempted rejection of the collator's

17 comments about the prior attempt carries no weight, we

18 say.

19 Witness EA was the most senior Army Intelligence

20 officer in Northern Ireland in 1998 as chief G2 in HQNI

21 and he said, reading that, ie the collator's comments:

22 "At face value, in isolation, 12 years on, I suspect

23 that the individual believed it occurred and had good

24 reason to believe it occurred."

25 Whatever one may think about the phraseology of

93
 1 MD01-0008 it is clear that in January 1998 army

2 intelligence linked the Maghaberry incident in

3 April 1997 with Billy Wright's murder.

4 However, nowhere in the documents supplied by the

5 MoD to the Inquiry are there any intelligence reports

6 linking the incident to the Billy Wright murder, but for

7 the reasons outlined in the testimony of AD and EA, such

8 material, we say, must exist.

9 The Wright family would submit in the absence of

10 a satisfactory explanation that it has been withheld

11 from the Inquiry by the MoD, as it would no doubt show,

12 if disclosed, that the army had in their possession

13 pre-murder intelligence linking McWilliams to an attempt

14 to kill Billy Wright in prison.

15 Dealing then with the question of the G2 incident

16 report. The next matter of concern for the family is

17 the absence before the Inquiry of what is known as a G2

18 incident report. During evidence given by 3 Brigade

19 RMIO on Day 57 of the Rosemary Nelson Inquiry, he was

20 referred to what was described as a G2 incident report.

21 The document was described by the Nelson Inquiry Counsel

22 as follows:

23 "Section 1, the description of the incident."

24 It then goes on to describe the security forces

25 operations and reaction. Overleaf, the sections are:

94
 1 "Sightings of related intelligence, "Comment and

2 local reaction", "Summary of deductions", and lastly,

3 "Conclusion".

4 Clearly, if the army had an interest in

5 an intelligence lapse prior to Billy Wright's murder,

6 then an army G2 incident report is a significant

7 document and the review of prior intelligence in the

8 system is of considerable importance. One cannot

9 imagine the army intelligence set-up differs between the

10 two brigades 30 miles apart.

11 The correspondence between the Wright family

12 representatives, the Inquiry and the MoD deserves

13 careful reading, as, in the mind of the family, it

14 demonstrates there has been a series of threadbare,

15 inconsistent and disingenuous answers provided by the

16 MoD on this matter. The correspondence is set out in

17 detail on line 25 at page 223 of the written submission.

18 The conclusion of the statement of chief G2 at

19 WS416-0001 says he did not personally prepare a G2

20 incident report, but the Nelson G2 incident report is

21 the only one bearing that heading of which he is aware.

22 We say, despite the Nelson witness saying this was

23 something the army did in response to every serious

24 witness (sic) and that he was unable to comment on the

25 whereabouts of any such report.

95
 1 The family take the view that such a report was

2 prepared but withheld from the Inquiry, as they believe

3 it contains the prior intelligence that led to the

4 controversial comments made in MD01-0008.

5 Finally, it is our contention that the MoD failed to

6 properly comply with the notice for production issued by

7 the Inquiry in respect of all relevant documents. Once

8 the distribution of the NIIR SS01-0358 became known, the

9 Inquiry had to be asked by ourselves to establish if the

10 MoD had received this NIIR.

11 It replied positively but indicated that they did

12 not disclose this previously because of a belief that it

13 had already been supplied by the Security Service. In

14 other words, the MoD withheld the NIIR in their

15 possession from the Inquiry.

16 The excuses offered in evidence find neither

17 acceptance nor credence with the Wright family. The

18 conduct in that respect casts doubt upon the integrity

19 of the response of the MoD to the Inquiry in respect of

20 its notice for all documents. This non-disclosure adds

21 fuel to the fire of suspicion that they also withheld

22 the G2 incident report and that material underpinning

23 the comments in MD01-0008.

24 In conclusion, it is our submission that the MoD

25 should be the subject of criticism for withholding

96
 1 documents from the Inquiry and failing to comply with

2 the statutory notice.

3 If I then could go back, Mr Chairman, because I see

4 I still have some little time, and deal with the issue

5 of the Minister, Mr Adam Ingram. For ease of reference,

6 this is at page 105.

7 Adam Ingram was the Security Minister in

8 Northern Ireland following Labour's election victory in

9 May 1997. NIPS was a Next Steps Agency which had a very

10 clear and specific role for a Minister to set

11 a strategic policy and become engaged where matters of

12 an operational nature needed the engagement of that

13 Minister.

14 Mr Johnson ridiculed our suggestion that the

15 Minister should have taken an interest in Billy Wright's

16 location as being based on a misunderstanding of the

17 arrangements under the framework agreement.

18 We say that our misunderstandings, if such exist,

19 take second place to his deliberate ignoring of the

20 reality of the high-level consideration which was being

21 given to Billy Wright at this time.

22 Ultimate responsibility for prisons lay at the door

23 of the Minister. Mr Ingram accepted that if he had been

24 unhappy with any operational decision, it would have

25 been within his rights to step in and do something about

97
 1 it.

2 Secondly, Mr Ingram accepted that all prison rules

3 and regulations were not being applied, and that he, as

4 Minister, as well as management, accepted that that was

5 the reality. It is against those requirements and

6 standards that the actions of Mr Ingram as Security

7 Minister should be judged.

8 On 1 July 1997, there was a meeting with the Prison

9 Officers' Association, which I have already referred to.

10 This was the first occasion on which Mr Ingram had made

11 with the POA since taking office. The Minister had been

12 provided in advance with a briefing from his officials.

13 We say clearly that, on any reading of that

14 briefing, the agenda was essentially a financial one.

15 It is submitted that, as far as NIPS and the Minister

16 were concerned, the financial aspects of running

17 a prison were of paramount importance. Finlay Spratt

18 described it indeed as "always money".

19 After being shown this briefing, Mr Spratt

20 concluded:

21 "We have always been controlled in terms of money in

22 relation to our security. Life didn't mean anything.

23 It was money."

24 Mr Johnson ridiculed Mr Spratt's remark that it was

25 all down to money. We say, however, the exaggeration of

98
 1 the place of money within the Prison Service thinking

2 can easily be inferred on anyone's analysis of the

3 briefing document prepared for the Minister in advance

4 of that meeting.

5 This brings into sharp focus the fact that the

6 Minister and NIPS had financial considerations at the

7 top of their agenda over and above all matters including

8 those of security.

9 Mr Ingram did indicate that if there had been

10 a specific threat, then this was something which should

11 have been passed to the police. Mr Johnson, on behalf

12 of Mr Ingram, failed to recognise that it was his own

13 witness who stated that the police should have been

14 notified that there was a threat as set out in

15 footnote 5-6 of our submission, and we say also

16 an example of this procedure can be found at NP16-0645.

17 In relation to the meeting, if the Panel accept that

18 this matter was, in fact, raised by Mr Duffy, then it is

19 submitted that Mr Ingram and NIPS should be the subject

20 of criticism for not passing on this threat and ensuring

21 that further enquiries were made.

22 It should also be borne in mind that, again,

23 Mr Johnson gave little or no weight, we say, to the

24 positive assertions made by Shannon that he had no

25 recollection of the threat being made, and of Mr Spratt,

99
 1 who had no recollection of what local issues were raised

2 at the meeting with Mr Ingram.

3 In the absence of such recollections, then the

4 Inquiry, we say, is invited to accept the evidence of

5 Mr Duffy and the supporting handwritten documentary

6 evidence which we have previously highlighted.

7 The concerns and the threat raised at this meeting

8 form part of a jigsaw of threats and concerns that were

9 to be raised over the subsequent months, as will be

10 seen. These have already been dealt with in some

11 measure. The first of those was the concerns expressed

12 by NIACRO who met with Mr Ingram on 10 July. Those

13 concerns are set out on page 108.

14 I should say in passing that we do accept the

15 criticism that the use of the word "contemporaneous" was

16 perhaps stretching the matter beyond its true and proper

17 meaning and we are happy to withdraw that word from our

18 submissions.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Where is it?

20 MR KANE: It is on line 9 of page 108. The "NIIR" has to

21 come out as well.

22 The LVF riot occurred in H6 on 13 August 1997.

23 Mr Ingram was sent a minute from Mr Mogg regarding the

24 riot, wherein it was stated:

25 "Ten prisoners had climbed up onto the roof and were

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 1 attempting to reach the other side of the block to

2 attack INLA prisoners located in A wing of the same

3 block."

4 There was a Red Cross inspection. Mike Newell, he

5 said that if the Red Cross were involved in any prison

6 throughout the world, people would listen to what they

7 say. Mr Ingram expressed a similar view.

8 Ministerial approval was necessary for such a visit.

9 The note requesting permission concluded:

10 "We will keep the Minister informed of developments

11 and provide a report of the visit at the appropriate

12 time."join end here^

13 Criticism from this Inquiry should attend the

14 failure of NIPS to provide the Minister with the report

15 much more quickly while a determination should be made

16 that Mr Ingram should have chased up a copy of this

17 report via his officials. Yesterday I made it clear

18 that we did not accept this was not an inordinate delay.

19 When the issues raised about the Red Cross visit

20 were put to Mr Ingram in cross-examination, he

21 considered this was part of a common narrative and he

22 did not think there was anything new in what the

23 Red Cross were saying. It is submitted this is not, in

24 fact, correct, but, rather, these were new matters which

25 were of significance. It is for the Panel to decide

101
 1 whether the Minister was residing in a state of blissful

2 ignorance, whether the Minister was out of step with the

3 opinions of others, or whether he was being disingenuous

4 in his evidence.

5 The matters raised in the Red Cross emphasise the

6 importance to the Minister not having been made aware of

7 the information. The question is, therefore, whether

8 this would have been the tipping point which would have

9 caused the Minister to have moved either the LVF or INLA

10 from H6 if he had been made aware. It is our view that

11 it clearly would, given that it subverted Mogg's

12 so-called "no first strike" agreement, and the validity

13 of relying on such should have been seriously questioned

14 at that time.

15 We say that NIPS should be the subject of criticism

16 for failing to promptly provide details of the Red Cross

17 to the Minister, while the Minister's lack of

18 inquisition of his officials and the Northern Ireland

19 Prison Service about such an important international

20 visit should equally attract an adverse determination.

21 We say that a further opportunity to halt the downward

22 spiral which facilitated Billy Wright's death was

23 squandered.

24 The role of Martin Mogg as Governor of the Maze and

25 Director of Operations was considered during the course

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 1 of the Inquiry. Whilst Mr Ingram accepted that it was

2 unsatisfactory that Martin Mogg was both the Governor of

3 the Maze and also the Director of Operations, it is

4 submitted that he should be criticised for allowing him

5 to have two roles and also not having gone through the

6 correct and proper procedures for the selection of

7 a suitable candidate for such an important position.

8 Dealing then with the adjournment debate in the

9 House of Commons, this debate was clearly on the murder

10 of Billy Wright. It must be stated categorically it was

11 not a general debate being held on Northern Ireland

12 prisons. What was being said was meant, we say, to

13 represent what the Northern Ireland Prison Service were

14 doing at the time the murder occurred.

15 The issue of searching was considered, and this

16 culminated in the December Monthly Intelligence Report,

17 where it was indicated that:

18 "Due to staff shortages no full searching of

19 prisoner accommodation that is taken place since

20 mid-July."

21 Mr Ingram accepted that, as he would have received

22 many of those documents, "that I would have been aware".

23 At no stage during the debate did Mr Ingram indicate

24 that there had been no cell searching for six months

25 prior to the murder of Billy Wright.

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 1 The reasons given, we say, were not acceptable.

2 This was a matter of knowledge which he was fixed with

3 and we submit he should have made this matter clear when

4 he was addressing Parliament.

5 On the question of fabric checks, Mr Ingram accepted

6 that fabric checks were not being done properly and that

7 this was a work in progress. When it was put to him

8 that the quality was not consistent or perhaps even

9 satisfactory, Mr Ingram responded, "I think everyone

10 knew that".

11 It is submitted again that the body of evidence that

12 exists relating to fabric checks does not bear

13 a resemblance to the representations that were made by

14 Mr Ingram in the adjournment debate on 21 January 2008.

15 On the matter of headcounts, when it came to the

16 headcounts Mr Ingram relied solely on what his officials

17 had told him. Mr Ingram had answered a written

18 Parliamentary question tabled by Mr Soames. We say it

19 is therefore clear that the information provided by the

20 officials to the Minister did not accurately reflect

21 what was going on within the prison, and the Inquiry can

22 have little doubt that the explicit reply of the

23 Minister was, therefore, wholly inaccurate.

24 On other issues, Mr Ingram accepted that access to

25 the yards at night was an issue being addressed by the

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 1 Steele Inquiry. It was the subject of an unresolved

2 failure to agree notice, and that no reference was made

3 to this issue in the adjournment debate. It is the

4 decision by the Minister not to include this issue and

5 inform Parliament which should be the subject of

6 criticism.

7 In relation to the Steele Inquiry matters there was

8 a significant gap from the report by Mr Shannon on 17

9 June 1997 to the report in December 1997. Mr Ingram, as

10 the Minister responsible for prisons, should have made

11 his own enquiry in relation to the progress being made

12 with the Steele Inquiry. The influence of politics

13 can't be underestimated in relation to how the Maze

14 operated. Mr Ingram accepted that the management at the

15 Maze could prove a tipping-point as far as the peace

16 process was concerned, and that this was made clear by

17 those in the prison and outside of the prison.

18 Tightening security would annoy prisoners, and that

19 annoying prisoners could have resulted in the death of

20 prison officers. It may be the view that the mantra of

21 the desire of not annoying prisoners was a ready but

22 feeble excuse for inaction facilitating death.

23 It is submitted that this "at all costs" approach

24 was wrong in that it did not take into account the

25 duties and obligations that attach to running

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 1 a Prison Service and in securing the right to life of

2 those within.

3 On the question of intelligence, Mr Ingram was

4 Security Minister, and as such he had access to

5 intelligence information that was in the system along

6 with holding frequent meetings with security and

7 intelligence personnel. Mr Ingram would, therefore,

8 have known the full picture as to what was going on

9 within the prison and outside. Mr Ingram accepted the

10 INLA was more active than other organisations during the

11 latter part of 1997. It would appear that if the

12 Minister is to be believed, he was told little, if

13 anything, of the background to the murder of

14 Billy Wright beyond what was known publicly or at CID

15 level. There certainly is nothing to suggest any

16 enquiry being made as to why all the matters contained

17 in SS01-0385 were not uncovered before the event and

18 what steps were being taken to ensure, if there was such

19 a desire, that a similar incident did not thereafter

20 occur.

21 After the murder of Billy Wright Mr Ingram would

22 have asked the following he said:

23 "Tell me everything we knew at the time."

24 There does not appear to be any record showing

25 everything or anything Mr Ingram was told about the

106
 1 murder of Billy Wright.

2 Mr Ingram, as Minister for prisons, should be the

3 subject of criticism for his knowledge of and acceptance

4 that the prison rules and regulations were not being

5 applied within the Maze. There was a considerable body

6 of warnings and concerns which, when coupled with the

7 intelligence information that Mr Ingram had, would

8 reasonably have led to a decision to move either the LVF

9 or INLA to a different location. NIPS should be

10 criticised for not having provided the report and

11 details on the Red Cross visit.

12 Dealing then with the representations to the

13 Minister -- we say before that, however, that Mr Ingram

14 should be roundly criticised for the representations

15 that he made to Parliament during the adjournment debate

16 on 21 January 1998. It is submitted that it is clear

17 what was being submitted to Parliament did not reflect

18 the reality within the Maze at the time of the murder of

19 Billy Wright.

20 Alan Shannon was the principal adviser on prison

21 matters to the Security Minister. Martin Mogg had

22 updated Mr Shannon on the Maze on 20 November 1997.

23 That paper set out clearly the difficulties that were

24 faced in relation to the operation of the Maze at that

25 time. It is submitted that the true picture was not

107
 1 passed on to the Minister by Mr Shannon. The details of

2 the differences between the documents are set out by

3 ourselves at page 119 of our written submissions and

4 thereafter. The comparison between what was presented

5 to the Minister and what the reality of the situation in

6 the Maze was very marked, we say. Mr Shannon had to

7 concede if he had phoned up Mr Davis, the Security

8 Governor, prior to going off on his Christmas holidays

9 and told him about the matters that had been presented

10 to the Minister, that Mr Davis would not have recognised

11 what the Minister was being told as representative of

12 what was going on in the prison. We say such

13 double-speak was unnecessary and unbecoming of

14 Mr Shannon, who was meant to diligently advise the

15 Minister. On the other hand, perhaps Mr Shannon was

16 merely complying with the prevailing ethos that security

17 matters took second place to political considerations

18 when he said:

19 "It was a question of balancing, of taking whatever

20 was necessary to safeguard security and safety, but not

21 going so far that it destroyed the prospects of

22 political development."

23 Would your Lordship just give me one moment, please?

24 Mr Chairman, members, you have been patient in

25 listening to the various matters which I have put. Can

108
 1 I say in conclusion that this entire process has

2 obviously been particularly arduous for the Wright

3 family. There has been condemnation of emotion entering

4 into the task which we have had to undertake. It must

5 be remembered that at the centre of this Inquiry there

6 is the death of a loved one of the Wright family. The

7 Wright family have since Billy Wright's murder sought

8 only to know the truth, not on any personal, prejudiced

9 or particular terms, but in its singular simplicity.

10 There is only one truth.

11 We say that the prison authorities and State

12 agencies, as we have outlined, stand accused of various

13 wrongful acts and omissions which we have set out in

14 substantiated detail over the past two days and in our

15 written submissions. Those wrongful act and omissions,

16 for which we ask for criticism and determination, to

17 varying degrees but clearly on a cumulative basis

18 facilitated the death of Billy Wright while a prisoner

19 in lawful custody in Her Majesty's Prison Maze on

20 27 December 1997.

21 His right to life, the most basic fundamental human

22 right, was his lawful due in any civilised, democratic

23 state. Regrettably there is evidence before the Inquiry

24 that is unknown to the Wright family and the general

25 public and consequently potential uncovered evidence.

109
 1 In relation to that we place our trust in you,

2 Mr Chairman, and your fellow members.

3 However, on the evidence which has been publicly

4 elicited we do invite this Inquiry to reach a conclusion

5 that the death of Billy Wright was facilitated by the

6 various actions and omissions of the various State

7 agencies which we have highlighted, and to answer the

8 question which was posed in the course of my opening by

9 determining that the State had a hand in the murder of

10 Billy Wright in an episode of Northern Ireland's

11 political security and prison history where collusion in

12 its nastiest manifestations was a central and damning

13 factor.

14 Mr Chairman and members, we look forward to your

15 report. That's all I have to say on behalf of the

16 Wright family. Thank you very much.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Just in case there are any

18 questions, Mr Kane, Professor Coyle? Bishop Oliver?

19 Can I compliment you and your team on a very full

20 and comprehensive set of submissions, which will provide

21 for the Panel much food for thought.

22 MR KANE: I am obliged. Thank you very much.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: I would just like to say one or two things in

24 conclusion, and it is conclusion, of this Inquiry.

25 I would like to thank all those who have

110
 1 participated professionally in the Inquiry. The

2 standards shown here have, in my opinion, been high.

3 The Panel is grateful to you all for your contributions,

4 which should assist them in reaching the correct

5 conclusions, and I do hope -- and it was our object as

6 a Panel -- that you will feel you had a fair crack of

7 the whip, because I think that's what Inquiries are

8 about. I appreciate that an Inquiry which was conducted

9 not very far from here was conducted under different

10 conditions. That was not the route we wanted to go

11 down.

12 I would like to thank also those who have provided

13 us with invaluable technical assistance. I have in mind

14 here the IT staff, mostly upstairs, but Mel sits down

15 here, and she has laboured valiantly, not least

16 yesterday and today, to produce LiveNote for us.

17 (Applause.)

18 Upstairs, of course, are Margaret, Pauline and Andy,

19 who have provided us with the transcripts and swift

20 location of documents to be shown on our screens. Thank

21 you very much. Liam, Peter and Dara are the audio

22 specialists and they are upstairs too. They performed

23 I think wonderfully well indeed. They scarcely put

24 a foot wrong.

25 I would like also to thank the IT team on the

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 1 ground. Many of us within this courtroom have reason to

2 be grateful to , Stephen and for their

3 assistance.

4 I would like to thank Nick and Ursula Yeates

5 for their managerial contribution too.

6 Oonagh's staff I am not going to name directly

7 except in connection with the Witness Liaison Team led

8 very well by Isla Jack. I am told -- I never saw it, of

9 course, in operation -- they did very well indeed.

10 We are also grateful to Mr Morrison and his team,

11 who provided their services with efficiency and charm.

12 We will now return to our office in Edinburgh, there

13 to write up the report. This will, of course, take some

14 time. At best we can predict when we will complete our

15 labours is likely to be in the early part of next year.

16 I wouldn't want to raise your hopes higher than that,

17 but you never know. We might complete it sooner.

18 I have, however, to inform you that we have been in

19 discussion with the Northern Ireland Office about

20 publication of our report. They have expressed a wish

21 that we should first submit the report to them in draft.

22 Our preferred option, for reasons I need not go into but

23 they are fairly obvious, is to publish our own report

24 free of supervision by the Northern Ireland Office.

25 Since that, it would appear, can't be achieved, we have

112
 1 decided to submit our completed report to the Secretary

2 of State for Northern Ireland whenever it is ready

3 and couple that with the issue of a public statement.

4 Publication, as you will appreciate, will then be in the

5 hands of the Northern Ireland Office and passes beyond

6 our control and our timing, but we are very keen to

7 bring this Inquiry to an end with as early a publication

8 of our report as we can. Thank you very much.

9 (12.55 pm)

10 (Hearing concluded)

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