- - - - - - - - - - BILLY WRIGHT PUBLIC INQUIRY - - - - - - - - - - held at: The Court House Banbridge County Down on Tuesday, 1 July 2008 commencing at 10.00 am Day 82 1 Tuesday, 1 July 2008 2 (10.00 am) 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Macleod. 4 MR MACLEOD: Thank you, my Lord. The first witness this 5 morning is Mr John Patrick Seaward. 6 MR JOHN PATRICK SEAWARD (called) 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Mr Seaward. Do you wish to 8 take the oath or would you prefer to affirm? 9 A. I'll take the oath. 10 MR JOHN PATRICK SEAWARD (sworn) 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Please sit down. 12 Mr Macleod. 13 MR MACLEOD: Thank you. 14 Questions from MR MACLEOD 15 MR MACLEOD: Is your full name John Patrick Seaward? 16 A. It is, yes. 17 Q. Mr Seaward, did you join the Northern Ireland 18 Prison Service in March 1983? 19 A. I did. 20 Q. Following a brief training course, did you move to 21 Crumlin Road prison in April that year? 22 A. I did. 23 Q. Did you remain there until January of 1993? 24 A. I did. 25 Q. At that time were you posted to the Maze and did you 1 1 work there all through that year and well beyond 1997? 2 A. I did. 3 Q. What differences did you notice between your ten years 4 at Belfast and the Maze when you went there? 5 A. The Maze was a liberal regime. There was no locks on 6 the doors. You sort of really had no control. Only the 7 outer wall was the only control you really had. 8 Q. As an experienced Prison Officer by that stage after ten 9 years in Belfast Prison, how did you feel going there 10 and seeing that? 11 A. Insecure every day. We really had no control over 12 anything. The inmates, they went with our -- they were 13 the authority figures, nearly, basically. 14 Q. During your time at Crumlin Road prison had you come 15 across someone by the name of Crip or 16 Christopher McWilliams? 17 A. I did, yes. He was -- 1984 he came in for manslaughter 18 of a police officer and I knew him from then. 19 Basically, throughout the years he was in and out. 20 Q. Right. What did you make of Christopher McWilliams? 21 A. A very violent, aggressive person at all times. In 22 control when he needed to be, but ruled with an iron -- 23 he ruled his men. He had men of his own. He ruled his 24 people. 25 Q. He ruled his people. Did you have any thoughts about 2 1 the fact that he was in H6 when you went there? 2 A. He wasn't actually in H6 then. He came to H6 after 3 a hostage situation at Maghaberry. 4 Q. What did you feel about that? 5 A. Well, we felt a threat, because at that stage he had 6 shot at a Prison Officer in Maghaberry and taken hostage 7 of another one. We were -- basically felt a threat at 8 every stage he was in the block. 9 Q. Was that fear then just related to you and your 10 colleagues or did you fear there might be trouble with 11 him and the other INLA members and the LVF faction that 12 were -- 13 A. It grew the tension within the block. You could feel 14 the tension at all times within the block. With him 15 being there all the time, he had the tension going at 16 all times. 17 Q. Mr Seaward, you are here today principally to speak to 18 the events of 27 December, but before we go on to that 19 could I ask you about something that you say occurred on 20 18 December, some nine days beforehand? 21 Were you on duty that day? 22 A. I was, yes. I was assistant storeman. The storeman was 23 off on holidays and I was the second, taking over his 24 role. 25 Q. Did you see some people coming to the block that day, 3 1 unexpectedly? 2 A. At approximately 12 o'clock I had a double store 3 issue -- or a treble store issue, sorry -- because it 4 was coming up to the Christmas period that we would have 5 had stores for the whole block. At 12.30 Governor Mogg 6 at this stage and Governor Crompton came into the block, 7 and they came into the block and didn't report to the 8 Control Room. 9 Q. What did you think of that? 10 A. Well, it's unheard of, because it's a situation of the 11 whole -- the Governor of the jail hasn't reported his 12 area where he's in. At that stage he went over and 13 reported -- he sent Governor Crompton over to the INLA 14 part and called for the OC of the INLA to be brought 15 out. 16 Q. This may be important. So that's Mr Mogg and 17 Mr Crompton -- 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. -- coming into the block. Did they report to the 20 Principal or Senior Officer's room? 21 A. No. I actually went over and reported to the Principal 22 Officer that the two Governors were within the block and 23 did he know, and he says he didn't. 24 Q. How unusual was it to find both a Governor I and 25 Governor II together in the same block? 4 1 A. Never, because your situation is if there is a hostage 2 taken, you have the two, first 1-IC and 2-IC of the 3 whole jail within one area. It's never done. 4 Q. Had you ever seen it in all your time at the Maze or in 5 Belfast? 6 A. Definitely not, no. 7 Q. You speak quite quickly, Mr Seaward. I am having some 8 difficulty picking up what you are saying. 9 Did you say this was about 12 o'clock when this 10 occurred? 11 A. No, 12 o'clock was when I got the stores in. It would 12 have been 12.30 actually. 13 Q. Before we go on to discuss what happened there, did you 14 say that you reported it to the PO or the SO when you 15 saw -- 16 A. No, it was actually the PO who was sitting at his desk. 17 I went in and reported to him. 18 Q. Did you know what, if anything, was done with the 19 information that you gave him? 20 A. Well, I assume he wrote it in his journal, because 21 I told him -- is it okay to say his name? 22 Q. Have you ever seen the PO/SO journal for that date? 23 A. No, I haven't, no. 24 Q. Could you look, please, at -- this will come up on the 25 screen in front of you -- NP14-3534? Do we see this is 5 1 the Principal/Senior Officer's journal. If we look to 2 the top right, for H Block 6. 3 A. That's correct, yes. 4 Q. If we look to the second page of this, at 5 page NP14-3535, if we look to the top: 6 "12.35. Governors Mogg and Crompton to see 2-IC 7 INLA H6." 8 Do you see that? 9 A. That's correct, yes. 10 Q. Does that time accord with the time that you would have 11 reported this? 12 A. Yes, that's approximately when I would have went down to 13 him, yes. 14 Q. Very well. That can be taken off the screen. 15 Did you see them speaking to anyone at the INLA 16 grille? 17 A. They brought out the 2-IC. The IC in control of the 18 INLA was out on home leave, so they brought out the 2-IC 19 and went into the Governor's interview room, which is in 20 the block, and closed the door. 21 Q. Right. 22 A. There was heated discussion but it was muffled, so 23 I couldn't actually tell you what was said. 24 Q. How do you know that it was heated, that conversation? 25 A. It was quite loud, actually. You could hear the 6 1 muffling -- coming out it was muffled. It was quite 2 loud, actually. 3 Q. Normally are we to understand from that that you 4 wouldn't really hear what was happening in that office? 5 A. No, you wouldn't hear nothing at all. 6 Q. How long did that meeting take? 7 A. Approximately 10 minutes or so. I mean, it is hard to 8 judge. About 10-15 minutes at the most. 9 Q. You were the storeman. Were you based in the circle 10 then? 11 A. I was actually -- the stores for the three weeks were in 12 the circle. I was starting to put them away. The 13 stores is right beside the Governor's office actually. 14 Q. So we can remind ourselves, perhaps we can look at 15 NIPSPLANS-11, which shows us the layout of the block. 16 If the centre can be enlarged, we can see that there is 17 what is described as the medical room and above that 18 there appears to be some sort of door, an outer door. 19 I don't think that was ever used, though. Is that 20 correct? That was, as it were, a back door into the 21 rear yard. 22 A. That's the back door into the rear yard. That's locked, 23 yes. 24 Q. In that corridor we can see a door into the storeroom. 25 Is that correct? 7 1 A. Yes, that's correct. 2 Q. Then beside that room we see the Governor's office. 3 A. That's correct. 4 Q. Did you say you were taking material during that period 5 from the circle into the storeroom? 6 A. I was, yes. 7 Q. Were you well placed to hear -- 8 A. Yes, I was. 9 Q. After this ten minutes or so, as you put it, did you see 10 the three men coming out? 11 A. The three men came out and the 2-IC started laughing and 12 shouting towards the block -- sorry -- down towards the 13 A and B side -- 14 Q. That is the INLA side? 15 A. Uh-huh -- that, "They think we have a gun". 16 Q. "They think we have a gun"? 17 A. He turned round laughing again and said, "You think we 18 have a gun". The two Governors at that stage vacated 19 the block. 20 Q. Would they have heard that remark? 21 A. Well, they were in range distance of a couple of feet. 22 Yes, they would have. 23 Q. Might you be mistaken about that? 24 A. 100% no. 25 Q. What did you think when you heard that? 8 1 A. Horror more than anything. I think we had been making 2 statements towards that there was a lot of tension 3 within the block. There was something in. These people 4 were here to interview an inmate and asked if they had 5 a gun. It was lunacy. 6 Q. I am going to show you what Mr Crompton had to say when 7 asked about this alleged meeting. We can find that in 8 his statement, which is at WS037-0003. You can see at 9 the top in paragraph 1 that he says his name is 10 Kenneth James Crompton. 11 If we move to page WS037-0069 in the same document, 12 and if we look to paragraph 217 at the top of the screen 13 onwards, so we look at these first three 14 paragraphs first, he is asked: 15 "Finally, I have been told by the interviewer of 16 an allegation that on 18 December 1997 Martin Mogg and 17 I visited H6 and spoke with an INLA prisoner named 2-IC 18 INLA H6 in the Governor's office, after which 2-IC INLA 19 H6 left and shouted towards the INLA wings 'They think 20 we've got a gun'. 21 "This incident did not happen. Had it happened, 22 I would have remembered it, but I have absolutely no 23 memory of it. I would not discount the possibility that 24 Martin and/or I met with an INLA prisoner that day, 25 albeit I do not recall doing so. 9 1 "My diary shows that on 18 December 1997 I had 2 a meeting about Investors in People at 9.00 am. That 3 meeting probably took place in the prison. I had 4 nothing else in my diary for that day." 5 If we move on to the following three paragraphs: 6 "The only times I can remember attending meetings 7 with prisoners in H6 are the two meetings I had with 8 Billy Wright. Both meetings took place on the wing, not 9 in the Governor's office. I later started to meet with 10 prisoners in the Governor's office, but that was long 11 after Billy Wright's murder ... 12 "There might have been an occasion when I met with 13 a prisoner named 2-IC INLA H6, but that name does not 14 now ring a bell with me. 15 "There was never any discussion with INLA at chapel 16 meetings about the possibility of their having a gun. 17 Nor was there any discussion of anything that implied 18 they had a gun." 19 Finally, if we look overleaf, WS037-0070: 20 "Had we received intelligence that INLA had a gun, 21 we would have arranged a full scale search of the INLA 22 wing. Such searches tended to be quite difficult ..." 23 and so forth. 24 If we take that off the screen, we see really that 25 Mr Crompton says quite simply that the incident did not 10 1 happen. You say that it did? 2 A. I say categorically it did happen, yes, 100%. 3 Q. Can I ask you then, Mr Seaward, did you not think of 4 putting in a half sheet about what you had heard? 5 A. At that stage -- within the Maze Prison I didn't have 6 any credibility after a while in it. It was so unruly 7 with everything that I just didn't think of it until 8 after the actual murder had taken place, at that stage. 9 We had informed the PO that the two were in the block 10 and what was said, but I didn't think about placing it 11 on paper at this stage, no. 12 Q. Right. What would have happened if you had submitted 13 a half sheet? Where would it have gone ultimately? 14 A. It would have went to them. 15 Q. And they had, of course, heard this information, you 16 say. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. So would there have been any point in putting in a half 19 sheet? 20 A. Not really, no. 21 Q. Can I then ask you, Mr Seaward, about the events of 22 27 December? Before I do that, I am just noting on 23 LiveNote -- this is the machine that we have here which 24 records what you have said -- a sentence that appears, 25 which says you didn't have any credibility after a while 11 1 in the Maze. Are you speaking personally there or do 2 you mean you and other Prison Officers? 3 A. Staff-wise as Prison Officers we didn't -- we were like 4 Security Officers minding a building, basically. That's 5 what was -- the management run the regimes. 6 Q. Was there any doubt about your personal credibility as 7 opposed to other Prison Officers' at this point? 8 A. No, no. 9 Q. So you meant in general terms. 10 A. General terms, yes. 11 Q. If we can now move on to the events of 27 December 1997. 12 What time did you commence duty that day? 13 A. That day I commenced duty was 8.15. 14 Q. Can we have up on the screen, please, WS282-0009? If we 15 look towards the top of this document, we can see that 16 this is the daily planner or roster -- 17 A. Uh-huh. 18 Q. -- for Saturday, 27 December 1997. You can see that. 19 Two lines down and along a little bit it gives us the 20 date. Do we see your name appear right in the middle of 21 that? 22 A. Uh-huh. 23 Q. "Seaward JP". Do we see to the right of that you were 24 to report to the block gate? 25 A. That's correct, yes. 12 1 Q. Very well. That can be taken off the screen now, 2 please. 3 What time did you report to the gate? 4 A. When I went to the block, I was detailed by 5 the Senior Officer immediately. We went in, there was 6 a domestic for an officer and would I take over. He was 7 dropping the stores post and I was to take over the 8 block gate. 9 Q. You have told us about the storeman position to some 10 extent. Did the storeman have any other functions? 11 A. In the sense of what? 12 Q. In the sense of any security functions, of locking or 13 unlocking any particular grilles. 14 A. At that stage -- I honestly can't remember. I can't 15 remember. Sorry. 16 Q. I interrupted you. I am sorry, Mr Seaward. 17 You were told to take over at the gate. Is that 18 correct? 19 A. That's correct, yes. 20 Q. When you say there was a domestic for an officer, do you 21 mean an officer had not been able to attend that morning 22 due to personal difficulties? 23 A. He had phoned in, I assume either the day before or that 24 day. 25 Q. Right. Were you told what length of time you would have 13 1 to be at the block gate? 2 A. Well, I was detailed there for the day, for that day, 3 unless there was another officer seconded up, but 4 I would assume it would be for the whole day. 5 Q. Which Senior Officer was it that asked you to do this? 6 A. Can I mention his name? 7 Q. Yes, you can. 8 A. Senior Officer Gallagher. 9 Q. We have heard that there were two Senior Officers in 10 H Block 6 that day. 11 A. Uh-huh. 12 Q. Mr Malloy and Mr Gallagher. Do you know which was the 13 senior of the two that day? 14 A. Well, Senior Officer Gallagher was detailing the staff. 15 That's an SO's position. Senior Officer Molloy was in 16 the position at the PO's desk, I would assume. We would 17 assume he was the PO that day. 18 Q. Might you be mistaken about that? Is that possible? 19 A. I might be mistaken, but to be quite honest with you, he 20 was sitting in the PO's position. 21 Q. That was the impression you formed? 22 A. That was the impression I formed at that stage, yes. 23 Q. Was it unusual for there to be two Senior Officers, 24 rather than one Senior Officer and one Principal 25 Officer? 14 1 A. Usually one would be acting up to the role of Principal 2 Officer as IC in charge of the block. 3 Q. As you have described it, the Senior Officer in that 4 event would be in charge of allocating the posts. 5 A. That's correct, yes. 6 Q. And the acting Principal Officer, as it were, would 7 remain in the PO's room. 8 A. Uh-huh. 9 Q. You think on that day it was Mr Molloy? 10 A. On that day, yes, because Senior Officer Gallagher 11 detailed me from the circle. 12 Q. Did you take up your post at the gate? 13 A. I did indeed, yes. 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Is that a slip? You say on that day that was 15 Mr Molloy. 16 MR MACLEOD: I will clarify that, my Lord. 17 Did you think that Mr Molloy was the acting 18 Principal Officer that day? 19 A. Well, I am assuming, because he was sitting at the 20 position that the PO would sit at his desk, yes. 21 MR MACLEOD: That's Molloy, not Gallagher? 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. Thank you. Can we then look at the gate so that we can 24 see whereabouts you were there? If we look at IP-3859, 25 please, we can see a view looking into the block from 15 1 outwith. We can see a sentry box to the right, just 2 slightly obscured by the fence. Is that correct? 3 A. That's correct, yes. 4 Q. Where did you go when you were detailed to go to the 5 gate? 6 A. Well, I would go down and relieve the officer, take the 7 keys. There is a radio transmitter. Whoever it was 8 would go back to the block. I would take a position 9 inside an airlock system actually. 10 Q. Where was that? 11 A. I would take up position in the centre, between the two 12 gates there. It is an airlock system. 13 Q. As I say, we can see the sentry box there on the right. 14 Would you actually go into that box? 15 A. You would go into it if it was raining or there was no 16 business happening at that stage. There is an alarm 17 positioned in it as well. 18 Q. Otherwise would you just walk around there? 19 A. In there, yes. 20 Q. Do you recall two vans coming into the yard on the 21 forecourt that morning? 22 A. I do. 23 Q. Would that be a red INLA van and a white LVF van? 24 A. That's correct, yes. 25 Q. Are you able to tell us which came in first? 16 1 A. I'm sorry. I'm not actually -- I basically can't 2 remember. 3 Q. Very well. Do you remember at one stage the two vans 4 parked up, essentially, in front of the block? 5 A. I do, yes. 6 Q. Are you able to help us with which was on which side, 7 the white one and the red one? 8 A. I'm sorry. I'm not. 9 Q. You can't? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Can I ask you to look, please, at SOCOPHOTOS-27? This 12 is a better view of the inside of the fence. 13 A. Uh-huh. 14 Q. Rather, the forecourt looking towards the Hennessy 15 grille. We can see a window to the right as we look at 16 the Hennessy grille, and presumably a window that has 17 been covered on the left-hand side of that grille. Do 18 you see that? 19 A. I do indeed, yes. 20 Q. Are you able to tell us if the vans would have been 21 parked near to these windows or some distance to the 22 left or the right? 23 A. They would have been up either side. There is a ramp 24 there actually for putting up food trolleys on. 25 Q. Yes, I see that. 17 1 A. They would have been parked up either side of them. 2 Q. Is that your recollection of the 27th? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. But you are not able to assist the Inquiry with which 5 was on either side? 6 A. I actually couldn't. It would be assumption. 7 Q. From your vantage point between the two gates did you 8 see some people just before 10 o'clock? 9 A. I did, yes, indeed. 10 Q. Who was it that you saw? 11 A. In the sense of coming from the block actually? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. There was Brian Richardson and Ian Cardwell pushing food 14 trolleys down. They were taking -- making their way 15 to -- they were on a tower, which is tower 8, and the 16 gates. They were going back to do the relief. 17 Q. They were pushing this trolley. Is that correct? 18 A. That's correct, yes. 19 Q. First of all, was that between the two vans? 20 A. The trolleys at that stage would have been left out and 21 would be on either side of the vans. So they would have 22 been pushed down, round the side of the van and started 23 to take them down. 24 Q. Did you see was it one trolley or the two trolleys being 25 pushed? 18 1 A. I think it was two trolleys. It was two trolleys, yes. 2 Q. But you are in no doubt that it was Mr Richardson and 3 Mr Cardwell? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Then did you notice other people as well coming from the 6 block? 7 A. Yes. There was inmates being loaded into the white van, 8 which was the LVF van. I would have been buzzed down 9 from the Control Room to say that there was a van -- 10 there was ones going to visits. 11 Q. Before we get to that, I just want to ask you about the 12 sequence of people emerging from the block. 13 A. Uh-huh. 14 Q. From what you have told us this morning it sounds as if 15 you saw the two Prison Officers with the trolleys first. 16 A. Uh-huh. 17 Q. Before you saw the men. Is that correct? 18 A. Uh-huh. 19 Q. Can I ask you to look at WS165-0014? In fact, the best 20 evidence of this might be your actual police statement 21 at WS165-0001. This is the statement that you gave to 22 the police. I see, as I look through the statement, 23 unfortunately, Mr Seaward, that there are lots of names 24 that have been given or taken out and letters put in 25 instead. 19 1 A. Uh-huh. 2 Q. If you just forgive me for a moment, we can perhaps 3 return to your statement. 4 A. Uh-huh. 5 Q. Which includes a clean version of that, which was 6 WS165-0014. This is essentially your statement which 7 has been cut and pasted into your Inquiry statement. We 8 see you give your name in quotes in the second 9 paragraph: 10 "I am John Patrick Seaward and I am a Prison Officer 11 based at HMP Maze ..." and suchlike. 12 If we look about 12 or 10 lines down you say: 13 "I took up my post and was there until almost 14 10 o'clock. Up until then it had been a very quiet 15 morning. A few minutes before 10.00 I saw two 16 prisoners, Billy Wright and Norman Green, being escorted 17 from the block to a prison van. They were accompanied 18 by an officer [that's the visits runner, who we can't 19 name] and [the driver]. They were closely followed by 20 Officers Richardson and Cardwell ..." 21 It looks from that as if the sequence was 22 difference. It was the prisoners who came out first and 23 then the people with the trolley. I appreciate it's 24 very difficult -- 25 A. Probably -- by the time they were pushing -- sorry. 20 1 THE CHAIRMAN: It is very difficult for the stenographer to 2 keep any record if you are both talking together. 3 I don't think it is possible for her to do that. Could 4 you each wait until the other finishes? 5 A. Okay. 6 MR MACLEOD: I was asking you why it was that your account 7 was different today. Might it be because of the length 8 of time that has elapsed since this incident occurred? 9 A. I would say so. It is 11 years nearly now. 10 Q. Would your recollection have been better when you gave 11 this statement? 12 A. It would have been given straightaway, that day 13 actually. 14 Q. That can being taken off the screen now so that we just 15 try to concentrate on your recollection today. 16 Following the emergence of these people from the 17 block, in whatever order that was, what is the next 18 thing you recall happening? 19 A. The two officers with the trolleys were coming down 20 towards me. The van started to slowly pace down towards 21 the gates. One of the officers pushed the trolley in 22 and assisted me opening the other side of the gate. 23 They are quite big gates and it takes time just to open 24 them. So he was assisting me to get them open wide. 25 Q. Which officer was that? 21 1 A. I think -- that was Officer Cardwell. Sorry. That was 2 Officer Cardwell. 3 Q. We have heard from Mr Park, the driver of the van, that 4 he would have been going at a walking pace in his van. 5 Would that accord with your recollection? 6 A. Yes. It was just tick-over pace coming down. 7 Q. As Mr Cardwell assisted you opening the gate, did you 8 notice something? 9 A. I noticed a head appear -- sorry -- a body appear on the 10 roof above A wing. 11 Q. Whereabouts on the roof above A wing? 12 A. By judgment, halfway up, about roughly halfway up on the 13 roof, towards the van, where the van was coming to rest 14 for the gates to open. 15 Q. Did you recognise that person? 16 A. At that stage not immediately, but when he jumped down 17 I did. 18 Q. For how long was he on the roof? 19 A. A matter of seconds before he jumped off the roof. 20 Q. What did you think when you saw that? 21 A. Horror, more than anything. 22 Q. What did you think might be happening? 23 A. I thought it was another hostage situation again, to be 24 quite honest with you. 25 Q. As this person jumped into the forecourt from the roof, 22 1 did you notice if he was carrying anything? 2 A. At that stage he had a coat. He had a coat and he run 3 across the front of the van and produced a hand pistol 4 from his coat. 5 Q. Was he wearing this coat? 6 A. He was wearing like a bomber jacket. 7 Q. Right. What, if anything, did he do with that pistol? 8 A. He put his left hand, tried to open the van with his 9 left hand and started banging the gun up against the 10 side of the van and telling the driver to stop. 11 Q. If we can just take it back a little bit, as it were, 12 you described how yourself and Mr Seaward were trying to 13 open the gate to enable the van to pass through. 14 A. Uh-huh. 15 Q. Mr Park told us in evidence that as he was driving 16 towards the gate, the gate started to be closed. 17 A. It started to open (sic), yes. 18 Q. Started to be closed. Did you try to close the gate at 19 all? 20 A. Initially, when the van was coming down, once the inmate 21 had jumped off the roof, the reaction is to close and 22 secure the area. 23 Q. So was that what you and he did? 24 A. Ian Cardwell and myself, yes. 25 Q. Was all this happening at the same time? In other 23 1 words, you were watching this as you were then closing 2 the gate. 3 A. I was indeed, yes. 4 Q. Is that because you thought, did you say, it might be 5 a hostage incident? 6 A. Once I recognised -- well, if any inmate comes off 7 a roof, it's a situation that there is going to be 8 a serious incident. So it is to seal all areas. 9 Q. As this person came into the forecourt and tried to open 10 the van with his left hand and starting banging the gun 11 up, as you put it, against the side of the van, telling 12 the driver to stop, was it all the same person you had 13 seen by this stage? 14 A. It was, but there was another two inmates starting to 15 drop off the roof at that stage as well. 16 Q. At this stage did you recognise who was doing that to 17 the side of the van? 18 A. I did, yes. 19 Q. Who was it? 20 A. It was Christopher McWilliams. 21 Q. Again, what did you think when you saw him? 22 A. Horror, because at that stage he crashed, which is to 23 put in a round into the automatic weapon, and pointed it 24 at the driver to stop. Then he pointed it at myself and 25 I done what he said. 24 1 Q. So we get the sequence right, you seem to go from him 2 being on the roof to this person being round the side of 3 the van. Did you see him come round the front of the 4 van? 5 A. He jumped straight off the roof into a crouched position 6 and run round the front of the van. 7 Q. He run round the front of the van. Did he point the gun 8 at the driver at any time? 9 A. Once he was at the side of the van he started to bang 10 the gun off the side of the van and tell him to stop. 11 Q. Right. Was the gate completely closed at this point? 12 A. Once the initial gun was there, emergency reaction sets 13 in. I closed the gates to my ability. We closed them. 14 We put -- we couldn't get the actual bar across, because 15 we had closed the gates wrongly. 16 Q. Did you have a good vantage point from where you were? 17 You could see what was happening? 18 A. By that stage there was another inmate running towards 19 us with another weapon. 20 Q. So did you take refuge somewhere? 21 A. We went in behind the sentry hut and lay down in 22 a smaller position, lay on the ground. 23 Q. Albeit the gates might appear to have been closed, would 24 there actually have been anything to stop the prisoners 25 coming through the gate? 25 1 A. It would have taken a bit of manipulation, but no. 2 Q. What is the next thing you saw after that? 3 A. Well, there was gunfire. We proceeded to open what they 4 call the wicker pedestrian gate, still in the crouch 5 position we were, and Ian hit the alarm. We locked the 6 gate to secure the area. 7 Q. That is the outer gate. Is that right? 8 A. Outer gate, yes. 9 Q. Mr Richardson would have been with you at this point as 10 well? 11 A. He was indeed, yes. 12 Q. Can you tell us how many shots were fired? 13 A. Initially there was two shots fired. When we started to 14 extradite the area we heard other shots being fired. At 15 that stage shock had set in. We thought we were 16 actually being fired at. We didn't know where they were 17 coming from or what was happening. 18 Q. Did you know what was happening in the van at this 19 point? 20 A. Not at that stage. Once we had exited ourselves from 21 the situation, we realised that -- I assumed that 22 people -- we realised there was a serious situation, we 23 had left people to die, but the training is to secure 24 the area. 25 Q. When you say you'd left people to die, you would have 26 1 seen Billy Wright and Norman Green going into that van. 2 Is that correct? 3 A. I would have seen them, yes. 4 Q. You saw them going into the van. 5 A. I would have. 6 Q. You saw Christopher McWilliams -- who, it would be fair 7 to say, was from an opposing faction. 8 A. Very much so. 9 Q. -- stopping the van with a gun, banging on the side of 10 the van and then you heard gunshots. Is that correct? 11 A. That's correct. 12 Q. So when you say you had left people to die, did you 13 realise at the time when you fled from the gates that 14 that's maybe what had happened? 15 A. We did initially -- I actually thought that everybody in 16 the van was killed. I never actually thought it was 17 just one person. I thought maybe they had killed 18 everybody. 19 Q. So when you saw McWilliams coming off -- this person 20 coming off from the INLA side of the block, you say that 21 you didn't know at that point that his objective was to 22 get at people in the LVF van? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Your instinct was to think, "This might be a hostage 25 incident". Is that right? 27 1 A. Very much so, yes. 2 Q. You told us earlier that McWilliams had a reputation for 3 such activity. Is that right? 4 A. Very much so. 5 Q. Did you notice anything else that was unusual that 6 morning before this incident occurred? 7 A. Prior to the incident there was a lot of bread thrown 8 out of the window. 9 Q. Of which side of the block? 10 A. Of the INLA side. An excessive lot of bread. I mean, 11 it was like -- it just came out of the window and was 12 lying on one side of the block. 13 Q. Was that uncommon for birds to be fed? 14 A. It was, yes. 15 Q. Why do you suppose that the bread was thrown from the 16 window that morning in such a quantity? 17 A. It was to take the birds off the roof. The Maze Prison 18 was a lot of wild life, you know. We had a lot of birds 19 of every description. It was to take the birds off the 20 roof to stop when the inmates were coming over the roof 21 disturbing flight. 22 MR MACLEOD: Thank you very much, Mr Seaward. 23 A. Thank you. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Donaghy. 25 28 1 Questions from MR DONAGHY 2 MR DONAGHY: Mr Seaward, good morning. I ask questions on 3 behalf of the Wright family. 4 I have just a couple of questions to ask you in 5 relation to the vans. I know you have given your 6 evidence that you can't recall the location of the vans 7 this morning as you have given your evidence. Can I ask 8 you, was there a procedure in relation to where the vans 9 may have been parked? 10 A. Not as I know, no. The vans -- basically, whoever was 11 in first would have just parked wherever required and 12 just sat. 13 Q. Was there a specific van for the LVF? 14 A. There was, yes. 15 Q. That was a white van. Is that correct? 16 A. That's correct, yes. 17 Q. If we can bring up the witness statement from 18 Witness YJ, which is an LVF prisoner, WS309-0014. If 19 paragraph 55 could be highlighted, the second sentence: 20 "Normally the van for LVF prisoners would have been 21 parked nearer to the LVF wing, and the van for the INLA 22 prisoners nearer to the INLA wing. Otherwise there 23 would have been a risk of getting into the wrong van or 24 being taken to the wrong visit." 25 In addition to that, we heard evidence, and there 29 1 has been a conflict of evidence in relation to where the 2 vans were parked, and Mr Boyd had given his evidence in 3 relation to where he believed -- he was the driver of 4 the INLA van. He believed that he had parked his van in 5 a certain position. Part of the explanation was that 6 you would want to keep the vans away from the INLA van 7 over on the INLA side and the LVF van over on the LVF 8 side. Would that have been anything you would have 9 heard of? 10 A. Not that I know of. Whether the drivers done that, 11 I honestly couldn't tell you. I don't recall that at 12 all. 13 Q. Were you aware of the concept of the iron curtain? 14 A. The iron curtain was -- yes. 15 Q. Can I suggest to you that would have been part of the 16 reason why vans would have been on one side and the 17 other side? 18 A. It could be the reason the drivers would want it for 19 themselves, yes. I wouldn't argue with that. 20 Q. In relation to the morning in question, we have heard 21 evidence from Mr Boyd and Mr Park as regards to what 22 happened on the morning in question. The distance from 23 the Hennessy grille to the front gate, how far would 24 that be? 25 A. Oh, 30-40 feet. Actually it would be the length of 30 1 a wing, basically, because that's what -- when you are 2 going from the grille, that's the beginning of the wing. 3 So you are talking maybe 25-30 feet. I honestly 4 couldn't tell you. 5 Q. You were shown your witness statement. I think it was 6 taken on 28 December. 7 A. Uh-huh. 8 Q. It was the next day. You accepted that your 9 recollection whenever you gave your witness statement -- 10 A. Uh-huh. 11 Q. -- would have been much better than it may have been 12 today. 13 A. Uh-huh. 14 Q. You say in that witness statement, if it can be brought 15 up, at WS165-0014, and if the middle section can be 16 highlighted: 17 "A few minutes before 10.00 I saw two prisoners, 18 Billy Wright and Norman Green, being escorted from the 19 block to a prison van. They were accompanied by an 20 officer [Witness ZBY] and John Park, who was driving the 21 vehicle. They were closely followed by Officers 22 Richardson and Cardwell who started to walk towards me." 23 From that, can we take it at that stage Wright and 24 Green, together with those accompanying them, would have 25 gone out first and got into the van that they were to go 31 1 off into? 2 A. Uh-huh. 3 Q. I think Mr Park, who was the driver of the van, said it 4 would only take a couple of seconds. It would take 5 a short period of time, less than a minute, to have got 6 out from the Hennessy grille and into the van. 7 A. That's correct, yes. 8 Q. So whilst they were doing that we had Mr Richardson and 9 Mr Cardwell who were walking down towards you. 10 A. They were pushing food trolleys down, yes. 11 Q. I think they had said they were going at walking speed. 12 A. Uh-huh. 13 Q. Does that accord with your recollection? 14 A. Uh-huh. 15 Q. There was nothing to impede their journey. They were 16 just walking down this distance of 25 to 30 feet. 17 A. That's correct, yes. 18 Q. You said you were made aware that visits were being 19 made. Was that in advance of Wright and Green coming 20 out? 21 A. The block -- there's a tannoy system to say there is LVF 22 visits going on and there's a van coming down now. 23 Officer Park would have radioed ahead to say he was 24 bringing visits down. 25 Q. That would have been tannoyed to you? 32 1 A. I would hear actually. They would tannoy there was two 2 to visits. We kept a roll down at the gate as well, in 3 and out, for visits-wise. 4 Q. Whenever you were tannoyed down, they had not exited the 5 block? 6 A. Actually, now I couldn't tell you. At that stage that 7 would be to maintain my numbers and make sure there was 8 nothing there. 9 Q. Once you have received that information, you would begin 10 to open the gates? 11 A. I wouldn't open the gates until the van was actually at 12 the distance into the gates in the front. The two gates 13 would open and the distance -- the van would just be up 14 to the gates so I would let it in, rather than have the 15 gates open any longer than we required them. 16 Q. As far as you are concerned, the van would start -- 17 A. It would start down towards the gate. Then, as the van 18 was in the distance, you would open the gates, get the 19 van in as quickly as possible and close the gates again. 20 Q. On that morning were you given any assistance? 21 A. The two officers, one was with the food trolley and 22 pushing the food trolleys into the side, because the 23 gates could take -- there was a distance for food 24 trolleys to push in. They had to go outside the block, 25 actually. There was a lorry came for food trolleys 33 1 every day. It saved the food lorry coming in as well. 2 We have would have put the food trolleys down to get 3 them out of the block. 4 Q. Yes, but in the morning in question did you get any 5 assistance to open the gate? 6 A. I did. I had Officer Cardwell assisting me. 7 Q. So as the van was then proceeding down to the gate, it 8 was moving, you were being assisted by -- 9 A. Assisted opening the gates, yes. 10 Q. How long would it take to -- I think in your witness 11 statement you talked about how long it would take to 12 open and shut the gates. If we can bring up WS165-0020, 13 and if paragraph 44 can you highlighted, you say: 14 "I have been asked how long it would take for the 15 gates to open and close, that is the main gate where 16 I was working that morning. I would say approximately 17 one minute. It did not take any more or less time that 18 particular morning." 19 That description would be you yourself opening and 20 closing the gate as a single officer? 21 A. It would, yes. 22 Q. Can we take it then that with the assistance of another 23 officer, being Officer Cardwell, that length of time 24 would decrease? Would it halve? 25 A. It would have. The gates -- as I said, we were opening 34 1 the gates that day. The van had just reached -- it was 2 on its way down when the assailant leapt off the roof at 3 that stage. 4 Q. Was the gate actually -- had the gate -- how far had the 5 gate opened? 6 A. The gates were, I would say, approximately -- they 7 weren't fully open at that stage. When the van comes 8 down, we open it, get the van in and close it as quickly 9 as possible again. 10 Q. Well, if we deal in percentages, how much -- if that's 11 the gate open and that is the gate closed -- 12 A. I would say there they would be halfway open at that 13 stage. 14 Q. It was halfway open? 15 A. Halfway open. Myself pushing one way and the other 16 officer lifting the other gate out the other way. 17 Q. So essentially a matter of seconds later the gates would 18 have been fully open and the van could have driven 19 through into the airlock. 20 A. At that stage the assailant was down -- yes, yes. 21 Q. Just examining in relation to what was happening. 22 A. Yes, yes. 23 Q. So it would have been just a matter of seconds later 24 that the gates would have been fully open and the van -- 25 A. Thereabouts. Approximately. 35 1 Q. Sorry? 2 A. Approximately. I couldn't judge that time. 3 Q. Thereafter, if you say that the whole process takes 4 about a minute to open and shut the gates for the van to 5 come in, with two doing it, that would halve to about 6 30 seconds. So it would have been a very short period 7 of time that would have needed to have elapsed -- 8 A. Initially the first officer that was assisting me, which 9 was Officer Cardwell, had pushed the food trolley in and 10 I was starting to open the gates when he came to assist 11 me. 12 Q. Just so the Inquiry are aware, the period of time that 13 would have been involved for this operation to bring the 14 van into the airlock and have the gates closed, the very 15 fact there were two officers there, we would have been 16 talking maybe another -- what period of time would we 17 have been talking? 18 A. It is hard to judge actually, to be quite honest with 19 you. They are big heavy gates. So it would be 20 a minute, a minute and a half. I'm not sure. 21 Q. You talked about the tannoy. Where would that be 22 located? Would that be in the airlock? 23 A. There is a tannoy in the airlock. They would be buzzing 24 down, yes. 25 Q. Who would be able to -- would it be a loudspeaker system 36 1 or how would that work? 2 A. It is actually like a grey box. 3 Q. There was a grey box? 4 A. With two buttons on it, a red button and -- they would 5 tannoy down to say, "Somebody is on his way down". So 6 we would mark on -- we had like chinagraph markers on 7 like a plastic, there were numbers we would keep in and 8 out, who was at visits, etc. It was just another method 9 of keeping numbers for the block. 10 Q. Was there a buzzer or anything like that to notify if 11 you were in within the airlock or doing something? 12 A. Yes. It would be linked to the Block Control Room, so 13 it would. 14 Q. How loud would that have -- 15 A. Quite loud. 16 Q. So someone some distance away could hear that? 17 A. Well, it was actually in the actual box itself, the 18 sentry box. It was actually inside the sentry box. 19 They would buzz you down to say there was somebody 20 coming down. 21 Q. Well, if you were opening the gates or elsewhere or 22 outside the airlock, would that have been audible? 23 A. I am sorry. Can you repeat that again? Sorry. 24 Q. If you were opening the gates, would you still be able 25 to hear the tannoy system? 37 1 A. If the door of the box, the sentry box was open, yes, 2 you would have. 3 MR DONAGHY: Nothing further, my Lord. 4 MR BOURNE: No questions. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Fortt. 6 Questions from MR FORTT. 7 MR FORTT: Mr Seaward, I represent a number of individual 8 employees of the Northern Ireland Prison Service, 9 including amongst those Governor Crompton. 10 I just want to explore the reliability of your 11 memory in relation to the meeting of 18 December. You 12 have already acknowledged to Mr Macleod that the passage 13 of time may have led your evidence to be confused. Do 14 you remember saying that? 15 A. Uh-huh. 16 Q. I am going to suggest that a similar qualification ought 17 to apply to evidence relating to that meeting as well, 18 for reasons I will come to. Okay? 19 A. Uh-huh. 20 Q. Do you remember saying in your evidence a moment ago 21 that during the course of this meeting you could hear 22 heated discussions coming from the Governor's room, that 23 there were loud muffled voices? Do you remember saying 24 that? 25 A. That's right. I did say that, yes. 38 1 Q. Can we have up, please, your Inquiry witness statement 2 version of that meeting, which is WS165-0019, 3 paragraphs 41 and 42? 4 You say there: 5 "The three of them, that is Governor Mogg, 6 Governor Crompton and [somebody else] then went into the 7 Governor's office and closed the door. I could not hear 8 what was being said. I could not even hear voices." 9 All right? Can you see the obvious inconsistency 10 between what you are telling us now and what you could 11 remember when you gave this statement to the Inquiry? 12 Yes? Do you accept your recollection is therefore 13 confused about some of the details of that meeting? 14 A. Some of the details, but not them all. 15 Q. The first account you ever gave, as I understand it, 16 about this meeting was when you gave an Inquiry witness 17 statement, some considerable time after the events. 18 That's right, isn't it? 19 A. That's correct, yes. 20 Q. Ten or 11 years later. Is that right? 21 A. No. Actually it was actually in the Coroner's Court we 22 were in I think when it was brought up. 23 Q. Right. That was a year or two after the event. Is that 24 the position? 25 A. Yes. 39 1 Q. Can you also look at paragraph 42, where you say there: 2 "After about five minutes [somebody] came out and 3 walked back towards the wing and shouted, 'They think we 4 have a gun' and laughed. He was then allowed on to the 5 wing again and the two Governors left the block." 6 All right? You don't say there anywhere, do you, 7 that the two Governors were present when this comment 8 was made? 9 A. What actually -- what I can recollect when I gave my 10 statement is that the Governors were leaving the block. 11 They were -- to leave a block you actually have to 12 page out. You have to -- there has to be a number hit 13 in to release the electric locks. They would have been 14 leaving. 15 Q. The way your account reads there suggests, in fact, that 16 the prisoner had come out of the room first, made the 17 comment and then gone, and the Governors then leave. 18 A. The prisoner was making his way over towards the INLA 19 A and B wings, so he was. 20 Q. You accept that there is no suggestion at all in that 21 paragraph that the Governors were present? 22 A. Well, they had not left actually the block at that 23 stage. They definitely had not. They were leaving -- 24 they were actually going from the block. 25 Q. You can see the difference between them being present in 40 1 the block and being present within earshot of the 2 comment being made, can't you? 3 A. I would agree, yes. 4 Q. So it is entirely possible, given the way you posed the 5 answer during the course of giving your witness 6 statement, that they may have been still in the room and 7 the prisoner had come out of the room, on your 8 recollection as it was then, when this comment was made. 9 A. What I can recollect is that the Governors were making 10 their way towards extraditing themselves from the block 11 and the inmate was over at the A and B side. Whether 12 they heard him I don't -- whether they heard him, 13 I couldn't answer that, actually. 14 Q. No. That is the point, isn't it? There's no reason to 15 suppose they could or could not have heard him, because 16 you don't know what their attention was on, whether they 17 were listening or whether it was audible from where they 18 were standing. 19 A. It's up to them, whatever they heard certainly. 20 Q. So when Governor Crompton says that he can't recollect 21 such a meeting, but he is not discounting the 22 possibility it took place, but he is quite clear he 23 didn't hear it, that is the comment afterwards, that's 24 entirely consistent, isn't it, with your evidence, that 25 he may not have heard that comment being made? 41 1 A. I actually can't answer that. I can't answer for him. 2 I am sorry. 3 Q. You also said in your evidence that you thought it was 4 lunacy for the Governors to have asked the prisoner 5 whether he had a gun. Do you remember saying that? 6 A. I did, yes. 7 Q. Can I also suggest that you can't realistically give any 8 evidence that the Governors ever asked the prisoner 9 whether they had a gun, can you? You didn't hear such 10 a question being posed to the prisoner, did you? 11 A. No. I am only passing on the information at that stage 12 that I heard, after the inmate came out of the ... 13 Q. What you plainly did not hear was any Governor asking 14 the prisoner whether he had a gun. 15 A. No, no. Definitely not, no. 16 Q. Finally in relation to that issue, we know that you gave 17 a statement to the police very shortly afterwards, 18 didn't you? 19 A. That's correct, yes. 20 Q. You didn't make any mention of that alleged comment or 21 the account that you give now to the police, did you? 22 A. At that stage when I gave it to the police I was in 23 extreme shock. As far as I was concerned, a man had 24 drawn a gun on me. Technically I considered that 25 attempted murder, if somebody pulls a gun on you. At 42 1 this time I was in extreme shock. 2 Q. I want to move on to one final topic and it concerns 3 what happens when you are on gate duty and an alarm 4 sounds. Let us suppose hypothetically that at the 5 moment that you saw the prisoners appear on the roof 6 an alarm had sounded, because somebody in the tower had 7 sounded it as they saw them get onto the roof. What 8 would you have done differently, if anything, to what 9 you actually did in terms of closing the gates? 10 A. Seal the area. You would seal the area immediately. 11 I mean, that's what we were taught to do, just seal the 12 area. 13 Q. Can we take it that an alarm sounding when you are on 14 gate duty equates to: shut the gates immediately? 15 A. That's correct. 16 MR FORTT: Thank you. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Could I just ask you, Mr Fortt, that question 18 you asked, it's still on screen, you said an alarm 19 sounded from the tower. Is that hypothetical or are you 20 meaning in actual fact? 21 MR FORTT: No, that was the hypothetical I was putting, 22 posed, yes. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 24 Mr O'Donoghue. 25 MR O'DONOGHUE: This is my witness, my Lord. 43 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. 2 Mr Hunter. 3 MR HUNTER: No questions, my Lord. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Dunn. 5 MR DUNN: No questions. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr O'Connor. 7 MR O'CONNOR: No questions, my Lord. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr O'Donoghue. 9 Questions from MR O'DONOGHUE 10 MR O'DONOGHUE: I have just a couple of questions. I beg 11 your pardon. If you give me one second. 12 It is at page 14 of the [draft] transcript, if that 13 could be brought up, please. Is that possible? It is 14 not possible. Sorry. I beg your pardon. 15 You were asked, Mr Seaward, in relation to your 16 understanding of Senior Officer Molloy and whether or 17 not he was acting up as a Principal Officer. 18 A. That's correct, yes. 19 Q. Your evidence effectively that you gave in answer to 20 Mr Macleod was that because Senior Officer Gallagher was 21 giving instructions to staff and allocating duties and 22 Senior Officer Molloy was seated in the Principal 23 Officer's place, that you drew that assumption or you 24 drew the assumption that Senior Officer Molloy was 25 acting up as Principal Officer. 44 1 A. That's correct, yes. 2 Q. Just so you are clear about this, Senior Officer Molloy 3 will deny he was acting up as a Principal Officer, but 4 just so that we are clear, you drew that assumption 5 simply from the position in which he was seated and the 6 fact that Senior Officer Gallagher was issuing 7 instructions consistent with the Senior Officer's role? 8 A. That's correct. As I say, Senior Officer Gallagher was 9 assuming the role of Senior Officer. I had the 10 assumption that Senior Officer Malloy was acting up. 11 That's true, yes. 12 Q. If Senior Officer Molloy were to say he was not acting 13 up as Principal Officer on that day, would you be in 14 a position to challenge him on that issue? 15 A. No. 16 Q. If we could have WS165-0019, paragraph 41, which is 17 Mr Fortt's paragraph. Could that be highlighted, 18 please? When this paragraph was put to you, Mr Seaward, 19 you said that you might be confused about some things, 20 but there were other things that you were not confused 21 about. I just want to tease that out, if I can, with 22 you. 23 Do you see in paragraph 41 you say: 24 "The three of them, that is Governor Mogg, 25 Governor Crompton and [2-IC] then went into the 45 1 Governor's office and closed the door." 2 Is that statement correct? 3 A. That's correct, yes. 4 Q. Did you see them go into the Governor's office and did 5 you see the door being closed? 6 A. I did, yes. 7 Q. Can I ask you how long they were there for? 8 A. Five or ten minutes. I honestly could not tell you. It 9 wasn't very long anyway. 10 Q. Where were you when they were in the room with the door 11 closed? 12 A. I was standing out in the circle. I had stores there to 13 put away but I was standing in the circle. 14 Q. Were you working then or were you simply standing? 15 A. I was working. I was working. 16 Q. You were working. You said that this was unprecedented, 17 in the sense that you had never seen this type of 18 incident happen before. Is that correct? 19 A. That's correct, yes. 20 Q. The next sentence that you say in paragraph 41 is: 21 "I could not hear what was being said." 22 Is that correct? 23 A. That's correct, yes. 24 Q. You could not hear what was being said in the room. 25 A. That's correct, yes. 46 1 Q. Okay. The next sentence I think is the one where there 2 appears to be a contradiction between your evidence this 3 morning and what you said in your statement, and that 4 is: 5 "I could not even hear voices." 6 What is your evidence today? Could you hear voices? 7 A. As I said, muffling. It was incoherent. 8 Q. So you could hear something within the room, but it was 9 a muffled sound. 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. In your statement at paragraph 42 you then go on to say: 12 "After about five minutes [the 2-IC I assume] came 13 out and walked back towards the wing and shouted, 'They 14 think we have a gun' ..." 15 Who did you shout that towards? 16 A. He shouted towards the wing and towards anybody was 17 standing within earshot. 18 Q. Okay. Were there others who were standing in earshot? 19 A. There is inmates milling up and down the wing all the 20 time. I actually couldn't tell you who they were but 21 there was ones there laughing and ... 22 Q. When he came out of the Governor's office, did that 23 involve him turning left or right to go back towards his 24 wing? 25 A. Turning right. 47 1 Q. How far did he have to walk to go back towards the 2 grille on to the wing? 3 A. About ten feet. 4 Q. Did he come out first or did the Governors come out 5 first, to the best of your recollection? 6 A. To the best of my recollection he came -- he would have 7 come out first, because he would have went back to the 8 wing first. 9 Q. Do you remember who came out after him? 10 A. No. The two of them would have came out of the room 11 together, two Governors. 12 Q. The two Governors. Did they come out directly after 13 2-IC? 14 A. Uh-huh. They did, yes. 15 Q. At what point in that ten foot gap between the door and 16 the grille on to the wing was this comment passed? Do 17 you know? 18 A. The comment was passed -- 19 Q. I don't want you to say something that you don't -- 20 A. Five feet. 21 Q. Sorry. Bear with me. I don't want you to say something 22 for the sake of saying it. If you remember it, say it. 23 If you don't remember, simply say you don't remember it. 24 A. It would be about three or four feet from the grille. 25 Q. It was somewhere in that ten feet? 48 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. At the time the comment was passed, do you have a 3 recollection -- and if you don't, say you don't. 4 A. I do, yes. 5 Q. -- as to where the Governors would have been? 6 A. They would have been extraditing themselves at the 7 grille, going on towards the Hennessy grille. 8 Q. Approximately what distance would they have been from 9 2-IC when he shouted what you say he shouted? 10 A. About 7 -- between 6 and 7 feet approximately. 11 Q. Those to whom he was shouting, that's the other 12 prisoners who would have been milling about on the wing, 13 what distance would they have been whenever he shouted? 14 A. They would have been a grille's length away, 15 approximately 8 feet. They would have been at the 16 mural. 17 Q. So would the Governors have been closer to the prisoners 18 or would it have been the other way about? 19 A. Approximately they would have -- the Governors would 20 have been closer, yes. 21 Q. Do you remember if he shouted, "They think we have 22 a gun" once or twice? There seemed to be an impression 23 in your evidence that -- it may be I have picked it up 24 wrong -- that he shouted -- 25 A. Initially -- 49 1 Q. Just bear with me -- that he shouted it twice, whereas 2 your statement suggests he only shouted it once. 3 A. Initially he started laughing coming out, very loudly, 4 and then it was shouted. I honestly wouldn't be 100% 5 but I think he shouted it once down into the wing. 6 Q. Okay. Finally, you made a police statement in this case 7 on 28 December 1997, which was the day following this 8 incident. 9 A. I did, yes. 10 Q. Did you write that statement out or was that statement 11 made as a result of direct questioning by a police 12 officer? 13 A. It was done by direct questioning by a police officer. 14 Q. Okay. Was the purpose of your statement explained to 15 you by the police officer? 16 A. It might have been, but, as I say, at that time I was in 17 extreme shock when I made it. 18 Q. You were obviously an identification witness -- 19 A. I was indeed, yes. 20 Q. -- in this case. Did the police officer ask you about 21 anything other than the incident of 27 December, and in 22 particular your identification of 23 Christopher McWilliams? 24 A. No, he didn't. That was all he asked after the murder. 25 MR O'DONOGHUE: Thank you. 50 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Macleod. 2 Further questions from MR MACLEOD 3 MR MACLEOD: Just two points finally, Mr Seaward, from me 4 anyway. 5 The first is this. Mr O'Donoghue was asking about 6 the amount of times that this sort of comment was made 7 about, "They think we have got guns". 8 As it has been recorded by the stenographer, that's 9 the lady sitting to my right, she has you down as saying 10 earlier that you also said, "You think we have a gun". 11 In other words, the impression might be that was 12 directed towards the Governors when they came out of the 13 office, as well as them saying, "They think we have got 14 a gun" towards the prisoners. 15 What is your final position, Mr Seaward? 16 A. The Governors came out of -- it is 11 years ago nearly, 17 as I say. The Governors came out of the Governor's 18 lounge -- the Governor's office. The inmate came out 19 first and he was laughing and shouting, but that is what 20 he said, "They think we have guns". 21 Q. So did he not actually say to the Governors, "You think 22 we've got a gun"? You don't remember? 23 A. No. It wouldn't have been said. It was directed down 24 into the wing. 25 Q. You were asked by Mr Fortt on that point about you not 51 1 actually hearing the Governors question the INLA 2 Second-in-Command about that. 3 A. No. 4 Q. Is that an assumption you make, that they asked him 5 whether he had a gun or not? 6 A. It would have been an assumption. Whether the inmate 7 was making an accusation or making it up, I am only 8 passing on the information I heard that day. 9 Q. But really all you can actually tell the Inquiry from 10 your recollection is you heard laughter and the comment, 11 "They think we have got a gun"? 12 A. That's correct, yes. 13 Q. Really, so we can try to bottom out, as it were, this 14 question of whether there was a heated conversation 15 going on, do you actually recollect now there being 16 a heated conversation? 17 A. When you said about voices, it was muffling, you know. 18 It was quite -- I couldn't make out the voices actually, 19 but it was a heated conversation of some sort. 20 Q. I think I touched on this in my questioning of you 21 earlier. Was it a louder noise than you would have 22 heard normally when you were doing this job? Is that 23 all you can say? 24 A. You would hear nothing normally. You would normally 25 hear nothing coming from the Governor's office. 52 1 Q. Even if they were people inside there talking. Is that 2 correct? 3 A. That's correct, yes. 4 Q. Is that your position? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. So it was louder than normal. 7 A. Uh-huh. 8 Q. But you couldn't actually discern particular voices 9 within it. Is that right? 10 A. That's correct, yes. 11 Q. The final thing, again something that Mr Fortt put to 12 you, he asked you about the length of time, the passage 13 of time that has elapsed since you gave evidence, first 14 of all. Then you suggested to him that you thought this 15 had been brought up at the Coroner's Inquest. In fact, 16 if I were to suggest to you that there is no sign of it 17 being brought up at the Coroner's Inquest -- it is not 18 in your deposition and it doesn't appear to feature in 19 any of the questions put to you -- what would you say 20 about that? Might you be mistaken about that? 21 A. I might be mistaken, but I think it was brought up by 22 another officer, that statement. I understand, yes. 23 Q. That was my point. Did you discuss this with officers 24 at the Coroner's Inquest beyond the actual room that you 25 were giving evidence in? 53 1 A. I did, yes. 2 Q. Right. Was it in the course of that that you discussed 3 this matter? 4 A. I did, yes. 5 Q. Is that correct? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. But there was no record taken of it at that time. 8 A. Not that I know of, no. 9 Q. Have you any reason to make this up, this evidence about 10 the comment? 11 A. Most definitely not, no. 12 MR MACLEOD: Thank you very much. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Just so that we can be absolutely clear about 14 this, Mr Seaward, what do you recollect now the 2-IC 15 said as he passed towards A and B wings grille? 16 A. Well, the exact words was, "They think we have a gun". 17 Q. It is a single gun, is it? 18 A. Uh-huh. 19 Q. Because you said a moment or two ago, "They think we 20 have guns". It was a gun? 21 A. It was a gun. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 23 Professor Coyle. 24 Questions from PROFESSOR COYLE 25 PROFESSOR COYLE: Just on the events of 18 December, you 54 1 said how unusual it was for the number 1 and number 2 2 Governors to come down together. At that time Mr Mogg 3 had been Governor of the prisoner for about two and 4 a half months. Can you recollect how often previously 5 he had come to H6? 6 A. Governor Mogg I had not seen. That was the first I had 7 seen Governor Mogg coming up to the block. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. Other Governors were present periodically throughout the 10 week. 11 Q. Mr Crompton had been Deputy Governor for about 12 two months. How often had he come previously? 13 A. A couple of times up in the block. But due to rest 14 days, etc, I wouldn't have been there when he was there, 15 if he was up. 16 Q. So you had never seen him previously? 17 A. I had seen him a couple of times up in the block, yes. 18 Q. How did you know it was Governor Mogg if you had never 19 seen him? 20 A. Governor Mogg? I had seen Governor Mogg -- myself, 21 I worked the stores. I would have picked the mail up 22 and been down at the admin office, and the Governor's 23 office is there. 24 Q. So you had seen him but never seen him in the block. 25 A. No. 55 1 Q. Given that it was so unusual for the two most senior 2 Governors to come down, did you and your colleagues have 3 any discussion about this? 4 A. We did discuss. Again, as I said before, if you have 5 the first and second of the jail within an area that 6 could be taken hostage, it is in dire straits, you know. 7 It never happens. Not in my time anyway. 8 Q. So the fact that they came into the block together was 9 highly unusual. The fact that they then called for 10 a prisoner and went in the Governor's office was the 11 next unusual element. 12 A. It was, yes. The unusual part was they didn't sign into 13 the Block Control Room. 14 Q. Yes. 15 A. That was the major ... 16 Q. Did they tell an officer to go and get -- 17 A. The circle officer, the man in charge of the gates at 18 the circle, he buzzed and got the OC out for them. 19 Q. So he was told to get a named prisoner out. Then 20 I imagine it would be unusual that the two Governors 21 would interview the prisoner without a senior member of 22 the block staff being present? 23 A. No. On other occasions the Governors -- inmates have 24 been in with the Governors on their own. 25 Q. But not with such a senior Governor? 56 1 A. Well, not that I have seen anyway, no. Not in the past. 2 There has usually been a senior member of staff like the 3 Principal Officer. 4 Q. The next unusual element was the comment which you say 5 the prisoner made when he came out, about having a gun. 6 Did you and your colleagues discuss that? 7 A. We discussed it, because it was a fear factor after 8 McWilliams was brought down from Maghaberry. There was 9 always that fear factor there. The fear factor was 10 there. 11 Q. Yes, but neither of the two SOs nor any of you saw fit 12 to pursue that. 13 A. To be quite honest with you, sir, if I had put it on 14 paper, it would have went to them, basically. If I had 15 put it down on paper, it would have went to the 16 Governors anyway. It would have had to go higher, 17 basically. 18 Q. Indeed. What we have heard this morning is that you 19 heard the prisoner say that, but it has been suggested 20 that the Governors may not have heard that being said. 21 Would you, as the staff as a group, not wish to check 22 with any of the Governors was this, in fact, the issue 23 that was being discussed? 24 A. Within the Maze Prison the management didn't converse 25 with us in, as such, the likelihood of the running of 57 1 the jail. They didn't in any condition when it came to 2 that there. Basically we didn't know what was going on 3 half the time. 4 Q. But this was an issue that might well have touched 5 immediately on your safety. 6 A. The issue was why were they initiated up to us? Whether 7 the inmate has been truthful or made it up, I honestly 8 couldn't tell you. 9 Q. So you thought that this might have been, in jail 10 jargon, a wind-up? 11 A. I didn't take it as a wind-up. At that stage it was the 12 fear factor was there, because we were living in fear 13 every day. 14 Q. I appreciate that, but nevertheless neither you nor your 15 colleagues pursued it. 16 A. We didn't pursued it, on the reason that it would have 17 went to the higher management, which was the ones that 18 the complaint would have been made about, basically. 19 PROFESSOR COYLE: Thank you very much. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Bishop Oliver. 21 Questions from RT REV OLIVER 22 RT REV OLIVER: You came to the Maze in January 1993, 23 I think. 24 A. That's correct. 25 Q. When Mr Macleod asked you initially about your feelings 58 1 about the Maze you described it as being a very insecure 2 place, staff not in control. 3 Was that true from January 1993, in your 4 recollection, or did it change at some point? 5 A. It was like that in 1993 when I went. There was no 6 locks on the doors. The doors -- there was no locks -- 7 the staff had retracted out of the wings. Initially 8 when we went into the block we had two Republican 9 factions in the block; we had the Provisional IRA and 10 the INLA on the other side. That changed when the IRA 11 moved over to the other blocks and combined with other 12 blocks, and the LVF came in the following few years 13 after that. 14 Q. But you don't remember 24-hour unlock being 15 a particularly significant moment when things changed? 16 A. Actually, when I went to the Maze, sir, it had actually 17 happened. It was the first wave of officers went down. 18 The 24-hour unlock had taken place before I -- 19 Q. Before you went? 20 A. Before I went, yes. It had taken place I think a couple 21 of months prior to that, myself going. When I went down 22 there, I went from a locked regime to a liberal regime. 23 Q. Thank you. Then I wanted to ask you one or two things 24 about 18 December. You said it was very strange that 25 the two Governors didn't report to the Block Control 59 1 Room or to the Principal Officer. Can you remember what 2 their attitude, what their demeanour was? I mean, did 3 they seem agitated and preoccupied, and might that have 4 been the reason why they didn't report in the normal 5 way? 6 A. They seemed agitated, but they didn't actually speak to 7 us. They just came straight in and got on with the task 8 they were doing. They were agitated. 9 Q. But you can't remember any other occasion when 10 a Governor came in and failed to report in the normal 11 way? 12 A. No, most definitely not. 13 Q. Were there any other witnesses of what happened when 14 they came out of the Governor's office? I mean, the 15 officer on the A/B wing grille presumably had had to 16 unlock the gate to allow 2-IC INLA to come and meet the 17 Governors, and then unlock it again to put him back in 18 the wing. Can you recall who that was? 19 A. I am sorry, sir, I can't recall who that actually was at 20 that stage. 21 Q. Would there have been other officers within earshot? 22 A. At that time of the day, it was 12.35, it would have 23 been lunchtime and the block would have been in sort of 24 lock down -- not lock down, but it would have been 25 closed for business until such time as after 1.30. 60 1 Q. So it would be fairly lightly staffed at that particular 2 time? 3 A. It would indeed, sir, yes. 4 Q. Then at one point, when Mr Macleod asked you why you 5 didn't put in a report, you said "I didn't have any 6 credibility after a while in it". That may have been 7 a slightly loose use of words, because if you say 8 "I didn't have any credibility", it means, "If I had 9 done it, people wouldn't have believed me. I wasn't 10 a credible or a believable person", or you might have 11 meant you no longer trusted the system, so you didn't 12 think it was worth doing it. 13 A. That's correct, yes. 14 Q. It is the second of those two? 15 A. That's correct. 16 Q. Thank you. Finally, you saw the prisoner on the roof 17 and jumping down into the forecourt on 27 December. 18 A. That's correct, sir. 19 Q. Did he jump feet first off the roof? 20 A. He did, yes. 21 Q. Which is about 10 feet high? 22 A. Very much so, and in a crouched position, very, very 23 agile. 24 Q. Quite a risky thing to do, to jump from that height. 25 A. Very much so. 61 1 Q. You could easily have broken your ankle. 2 A. Very much so. 3 Q. If you were coming down off the roof, how would you do 4 it? 5 A. As the other two inmates that were coming down off the 6 roof, one dropped one down and then the other turned 7 round and dropped down. 8 Q. Put your hands on the roof, yes. 9 A. He didn't; he was straight off. 10 Q. The first one jumped straight off. 11 A. Straight off. 12 Q. But the others didn't. 13 A. No, they didn't. 14 Q. And you saw that happening. 15 A. I did see it happening. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. You can go now. Thank 17 you for coming. 18 A. Thank you. 19 (Witness withdrew) 20 THE CHAIRMAN: You have another witness but he may not be 21 here. Is that right? 22 MR MACLEOD: He was en route. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Would you let us know when you are ready to 24 start? 25 MR MACLEOD: I will do that. 62 1 (11.22 am) 2 (Short break) 3 (11.50 am) 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Macleod. 5 MR MACLEOD: The next witness, my Lord, is Mr Ronald Murray. 6 MR RONALD MURRAY (called) 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Morning, Mr Murray. Could I ask you: do you 8 wish to take the oath or do you want to affirm? 9 A. Yes, my Lord, I will take the oath. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Please do. 11 MR RONALD MURRAY (sworn) 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Please sit down. 13 Mr Macleod. 14 Questions from MR MACLEOD 15 MR MACLEOD: Thank you. 16 Mr Murray, did you join the Northern Ireland 17 Prison Service in July of 1982? 18 A. I did. 19 Q. Following a period of training at Millisle, were you 20 moved to Her Majesty's Prison Belfast and did you remain 21 there until February 1992? 22 A. I did. 23 Q. At that point were you moved and at the same time 24 promoted to Her Majesty's Prison Maze? 25 A. I was. 63 1 Q. After six to eight months as a Senior Officer in 2 a variety of posts, were you moved to the Emergency 3 Control Room? 4 A. I was. 5 Q. How many officers would be in the Emergency Control Room 6 at any time during the day? 7 A. Six officers on shift, one SO. 8 Q. That would have been a job as SO that you did from time 9 to time? 10 A. It would, sir. 11 Q. Well, in fact, that was your job. Is that right? 12 A. It wasn't the only role I fulfilled in the 13 establishment, but it was the main role. 14 Q. What else would you do? 15 A. There were six SOs in the ECR and there was only one 16 seat. So from time to time you would find yourself 17 another role. 18 Q. You have said that 40% of your time was spent in the 19 ECR. Is that right? 20 A. That's a guess on my part. About 40%. 21 Q. I am told that some people are having difficulty hearing 22 you. I wonder if you could -- that's better. Thank 23 you. 24 The six officers that would be in the ECR with you, 25 what would their duties be? 64 1 A. Each of the officers on post would have their own 2 individual duties. There were six separate posts for 3 the officers. 4 Q. Can you just run through them? 5 A. As I recall, I had one officer to my left who monitored 6 the blocks and the yards; one officer directly in front 7 of me who was the RT operator; the man to his right who 8 was the telephone operator; another man, the fourth 9 officer, to his right, he looked after the inertia 10 guards; on the extreme right-hand side of the Control 11 Room was an officer who looked after the monitors which 12 controlled or which observed the main gate complex; and 13 there was a further officer to his left, he had cameras 14 which observed the extern gate and he also had further 15 alarm panels there to monitor. 16 Q. Was there only one officer then looking at the monitors 17 that covered all of the H Blocks? 18 A. There was, sir. 19 Q. How many screens would there be there for him to look 20 at? 21 A. As I recall, there was a bank of monitors in front of 22 that officer, which was I think eight monitors tall by 23 about eight monitors wide. So he had about 64 monitors, 24 some of which had sequencing views on them. The total 25 number of views he would have had to cover I can't say 65 1 with any degree of certainty. 2 Q. Are we to understand, though, that there would be 3 somewhere in the region of 64 screens for him to ...? 4 A. As I recall. 5 Q. Perhaps we can just have a look at the photographs that 6 show us what the ECR looked like. We can find these at 7 IP-3909. 8 First of all, so we can get our bearings, where 9 would you be sitting when we look at this photograph? 10 Was it to the left or the right? 11 A. To the left, sir. 12 Q. Right. We can see banks of screens in front of us on 13 the screen. What would they be showing? 14 A. The bank of screens on the right-hand view, that's the 15 main gate area. 16 Q. Yes. 17 A. The console directly in front of it, that would have had 18 an officer there. He had contact with the main gate 19 area, views of it, and had the ability, as I recall, to 20 secure the front gate, if need be. 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. The man directly to his left and the monitors to the 23 left, as I recall, they monitored the sterile areas, 24 I believe. He also I think had a PTZ, the controls of 25 which are still sitting on the console there. 66 1 Q. Is that the joystick we can see just below the screen in 2 the middle console? 3 A. Yes, sir. 4 Q. That's for the PTZ? 5 A. At the extern gate, I think. 6 Q. Perhaps since you are essentially our best witness, 7 I suppose, for the operation of the ECR, perhaps we can 8 look around the room, as it were. If we move to 9 IP-3910, that shows us the screens we were looking at on 10 the right-hand side of the last photograph. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. And a whiteboard. What would be put on that board? 13 A. Staff notices. 14 Q. IP-3911, where is that now? 15 A. That's the entrance door to the ECR. 16 Q. Would the whiteboard be to the left of that photo? 17 A. Yes, sir. 18 Q. So the photographer is turning in a clockwise direction 19 as he takes these photographs? 20 A. It would seem so. 21 Q. IP-3912, what is that now? That's obviously part of the 22 same wall, because we can see the fan that we saw 23 earlier. 24 A. That's the console or the desk at which I would have 25 sat. 67 1 Q. Behind that, that would have been your phone, 2 essentially. Is that right to say? 3 A. As I recall, there were a number of phones on the 4 console. 5 Q. IP3913, what does that show us? 6 A. That is the numbers board, which was directly in front 7 of the officer who manned the RT set and directly to the 8 right of the officer who observed the yards and blocks. 9 Q. Right. What is the RT set? 10 A. Radio telephone. 11 Q. If we move to IP-3916, is this the bank of cameras that 12 you described earlier showing all the block views? 13 A. It is, sir. 14 Q. Might it be that it is 8 by 4 rather than 8 by 8? 15 A. It certainly is, sir. 16 Q. How easy would it be, from your own experience, to 17 monitor all these screens simultaneously? 18 A. A man couldn't monitor them all simultaneously. 19 Q. So was there any consideration of putting someone else 20 to assist that person? 21 A. Not that I was aware of. 22 Q. Do you think there should have been? 23 A. Perhaps in hindsight. 24 Q. Was it clear from your time, and clear to other people 25 at the time you were there, that there were really too 68 1 many screens for any one person to monitor properly? 2 A. Because of the difficulty, an officer wouldn't base with 3 such a post. That's why the officers on duty would have 4 rotated throughout the different posts and not stayed on 5 the one all the whole shift. This was the only 6 consideration given to the staff. 7 Q. A little bit like Air Traffic Controllers. There is 8 a limited period of time you can spend looking at these. 9 A. Absolutely. 10 Q. But the ideal situation, you are saying, would have been 11 for there to have been more than one person doing that 12 job? 13 A. Ideally there would have been, but of course there was 14 always more than one person watching these screens, 15 because each of the Block Control Rooms had their own 16 views. 17 Q. Of course. But in terms of the ECR, are we to 18 understand you consider there was a deficiency here; 19 there should have been another person looking at the 20 screens? 21 A. We were an Emergency Control Room. We responded to 22 emergencies. If there was an emergency, the officer on 23 this post would isolate that particular block. So he 24 was monitoring them, but when the emergency situation 25 kicked in, he specifically monitored that block from 69 1 which the alarm had been activated. 2 Q. Just so I understand your position, Mr Murray, are you 3 saying it is quite satisfactory now for there to be one 4 person looking at all these screens, or did you think 5 there should have been more people? 6 A. Well, I haven't given it much consideration, but there 7 was always an officer in each of the Block Control Rooms 8 with the same views, and he would have had much less 9 views than my man would have. 10 Q. Yes. What about the three cameras that were located in 11 the phases that were installed some time in 1997? Where 12 would they have been viewed, the images from those 13 cameras? 14 A. I can't be absolutely sure, but I do believe they were 15 viewed on the direct opposite side of the control room 16 from these views. 17 Q. Where we saw the joystick and the other -- 18 A. Yes, sir. There was a large gap in the wall of monitors 19 and I think that's where the PTZs were. 20 Q. Right. Was there also separately another camera, 21 an overview camera, covering the whole prison? 22 A. Yes, sir, there was. 23 Q. Whereabouts was that? 24 A. The same location. 25 Q. In terms of where the camera was, where was the camera? 70 1 A. The camera itself was mounted on a large podium or stand 2 to the side of the football pitches in phase 3. 3 Q. I wonder where we can see that. If we could look to 4 MODPLANS-1 -- this will come up on the screen shortly -- 5 if we can zoom in towards the centre of that photograph, 6 a little bit more perhaps towards T5 where we see it in 7 the middle of the image. If we just stop there, we can 8 see that there is a sports hall and a sports field. Do 9 you say that there was an overview camera which covered 10 the whole prison somewhere near the T5? 11 A. Yes, sir. Just direct -- just to the right of Tango 5. 12 Q. We can see that there is what looks to be a tower there. 13 A. That's correct, sir. 14 Q. That would be the T5 tower. You think there was 15 an overview camera there? 16 A. I know there was an overview camera. 17 Q. Right. If we zoom out again, please, and if we move 18 into H Block 6, which is on the left-hand side, and if 19 we can take all of that -- a little bit further, please, 20 operator -- we can see here clearly H6. 21 If we look to the left of the block in the sterile 22 area, we see a small square above the word "Wire". As 23 far as you were aware, was there a high-mast PTZ camera 24 put in there some time in 1997? 25 A. I'm not sure when the cameras was installed, but I do 71 1 know there was a PTZ at that end of H6. 2 Q. We know that was the one that wasn't working on the day 3 in question, on 27 December 1997. Did that operate in 4 a similar fashion to the overview camera covering the 5 whole of the prison or was it a different sort of 6 camera? 7 A. It wouldn't have been of the same high quality as the 8 overview would have been. It did not have a full 9 360 degree range of movement. 10 Q. Right. 11 A. But it was your standard, regular PTZ in all other 12 regards. 13 Q. We will hear more about this from other witnesses in due 14 course, but might it have been the case that this was 15 quite an effective camera, this PTZ camera here, and 16 that it could zoom in in great detail and was much 17 better than the PTZ cameras in other parts of the 18 prison? 19 A. I don't recall it having been any better quality than 20 any other PTZ, sir, no. 21 Q. Thank you. In terms of the cameras being broken, who 22 would spot that the cameras were broken? Would it be 23 the Block Control Room's responsibility to notify Works 24 about that or would it be the ECR's? 25 A. On taking up shift on whatever post each individual was 72 1 tasked to, it was their job to check the equipment on 2 their post. Part of that check would involve checking 3 the cameras. Should an officer in the Block Control 4 Room see a fault, he certainly should have reported it 5 to us, which we may have already have noticed, but it 6 was covering ourselves. We then would have contacted 7 the Trades Department and then they would have arranged 8 for repairs. 9 Q. In terms of the camera that we see still on the screen, 10 where it appears to have been positioned to the left of 11 H Block 6, that sort of camera, how long would it take 12 to repair that? 13 A. It entirely depended upon what was wrong with it, 14 whether they needed to send for parts or perhaps they 15 had parts in stock. But your average camera fault would 16 have been fixed, in the normal course of events, within 17 I would say roughly two to three days. 18 Q. Right. Can we look then at NP14-0806? Is this the 19 Principal/Senior Officer's journal for Monday, 20 22 December 1997 in the ECR, by the looks of it? 21 A. Yes, sir, it certainly appears to be, yes. 22 Q. Can we move to the next page at NP14-0807? Do we see at 23 1145, and there are asterisks on either side of the 24 entry: 25 "Phase 3 overview camera lost picture. 73 1 "Reported to Witness ZAF, Estate Management." 2 Do you see that? 3 A. I do, sir. 4 Q. I think it might have been me that mentioned Works or 5 Trades earlier and you repeated that. Might it have 6 been the practice to report such repairs to Estate 7 Management or do you still think it was the Works 8 Department? 9 A. Normally PTZs would be reported to the Works Department, 10 but that says "Phase 3 overview camera", so that 11 suggests to me that it was the actual overview camera on 12 that date that wasn't working, and I know that Prison 13 Estate Management, that was their wee project. That was 14 one they had brought in through their means, not through 15 regular Trades. 16 Q. I think you can take it from me, Mr Murray, that it was, 17 in fact, the camera which we looked at on the left-hand 18 side of H Block 6 that was actually out of commission. 19 A. That's not how I would have referred to that camera. 20 Q. It is not? 21 A. Certainly not. 22 Q. Right. Because otherwise they would just have reported 23 it as the overview camera, if you are right. 24 A. I would have reported it as the overview camera. 25 Q. Do you not think that might be right, then, that there 74 1 was this special camera, this PTZ camera at phase 3, and 2 indeed in the other two phases, perhaps along with your 3 overview camera covering the whole prison? 4 A. No, sir. There was only one overview camera. 5 Q. In any event, we see that it has been reported that the 6 camera lost its picture. Is that correct? 7 A. I can see that from there. 8 Q. Was there a procedure that would kick into place when 9 a camera would break down? Would other cameras be used 10 to focus in on a particular area? 11 A. If there was further capability from other cameras, they 12 would be used to cover the blank spots. 13 Q. Right. While we are looking at the journal, I wonder if 14 we could move on a few pages to 27 December -- or 15 25 December, first of all. If we move on to NP14-0815, 16 please, in the same sequence, and NP14-0816. 17 This is 27 December, first of all. If we look to 18 the next page of this, NP14-0817, we can see that 19 an alarm is activated. We can in the fourth line down: 20 "H6 see incident report." 21 Do you see that? 22 A. I do, yes. 23 Q. We will go on to look at that. Was that common to have 24 a separate incident report? 25 A. Yes, sir. 75 1 Q. If we can move back four pages to see if we can get to 2 the 25th -- perhaps another two pages back, NP14-0812. 3 This is the entry for Thursday, 25 December 1997. If 4 you can take it from me that you were the SO on that 5 day. Your name has been blanked out. Do you recall 6 being in on Christmas Day? 7 A. I don't recall being in on Christmas Day. 8 Q. It wouldn't necessarily be unusual for you to be in on a 9 Christmas Day? 10 A. No, sir. 11 Q. We are just using this really for illustrative purposes. 12 If we move on to the next page, NP14-0813, I want you to 13 look at the entry at 2103. It is about halfway down the 14 page. If we can enlarge that area. 15 A. Yes, sir. 16 Q. We can see: 17 "Phase 3 yards clear and checked." 18 Then at 2226, which is nearly 10.30: 19 "Phase 1 yards clear and checked." 20 Can you tell us what you understand by those 21 entries? What do you think they mean? 22 A. They would have been the reports for the phase SOs, to 23 let the main ECR know the state of the phase. They were 24 required to report to us when they had confirmed all the 25 yards had been cleared and checked. 76 1 Q. How would they know, as far as you were aware, that the 2 yards were checked and cleared? 3 A. As far as I can recall, the SO would have to visit each 4 of the blocks, enquire of the staff as to the state of 5 the yards. 6 Q. Was that something you had done yourself from time to 7 time? 8 A. No, sir. 9 Q. It wasn't a role you ever had? 10 A. I would have done it in the first six to eight months of 11 my time in the Maze, but thereafter any night guards 12 I done were in the ECR. 13 Q. But that was your understanding, that the PO/SO in 14 charge of the night -- the phase officer overnight would 15 actually go to the particular yards. Is that right? 16 A. He certainly would have visited particular blocks and 17 checked with the Block Control Room that the yards were 18 clear and secured. 19 Q. Because otherwise the blocks could have just -- if the 20 blocks were doing it themselves, they could have just 21 telephoned you directly. Is that right? 22 A. Yes, sir. 23 Q. Mr Murray, I wonder if I can then turn to the events of 24 27 December 1997. Were you on duty that day? 25 A. The 27th? Yes, sir. 77 1 Q. What time did you start that morning? 2 A. I started about 7.00, 7.30. 3 Q. Was the ECR adequately staffed that day? 4 A. As I recall, sir, it was. 5 Q. Do you recollect an alarm being activated at that 6 morning? 7 A. Yes, sir, I do. 8 Q. First of all, at what time was that? 9 A. It was about 10 o'clock in the morning. 10 Q. What happened when the alarm was sounded? 11 A. When the alarm was sounded, we sealed the jail and 12 deployed the IRF to the scene. 13 Q. Let us just examine that a little bit more closely. 14 What was the normal procedure when an alarm sounded? 15 A. Normal procedure was you sealed the jail and deployed 16 the IRF to the scene. 17 Q. Would you know where the alarm was coming from? 18 A. You would know the block from which it had been 19 activated, yes. 20 Q. So that's the first thing you would do? 21 A. Yes, sir. 22 Q. You wouldn't seal the whole jail first? 23 A. You do, sir. You seal the whole jail and then you 24 deploy the IRF. 25 Q. But you have to look at where the alarm is coming from, 78 1 first of all. 2 A. No, sir, you seal the jail, and deploy the IRF having 3 identified the source of the alarm. You have to tell 4 them where to go. 5 Q. There would be false alarms from time to time? 6 A. Very much so, sir. 7 Q. Would an analysis have to be made of whether it merited 8 the deployment of the IRF? 9 A. No, sir. Every alarm is a real alarm until they tell 10 you different. 11 Q. In terms of the locking of the grilles, from where would 12 that be done? 13 A. The officer to my left, he would have locked the 14 grilles. 15 Q. Automatically? 16 A. No, sir. He have would have -- first of all, having 17 been told where the alarm was, he would have brought up 18 the cameras particular to that particular block. He 19 then had three grilles to observe. If the grilles were 20 locked, he would seal them with an electronic -- I think 21 it was a key he turned. If they were not locked, he 22 would -- it was a judgment call then on his part as to 23 whether to lock them, two locked and maybe one open, or 24 wait a second or two until the staff in the block had 25 secured them before he took over. 79 1 Q. So when you said earlier on that the whole prison was 2 sealed, what did you mean by that? 3 A. Main gate. No further movement in or out, sir. 4 Q. I see. Within the prison, though, within the blocks,